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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MC NICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals,
Defendants-Respondents.
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ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS'
FIFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGMEN:
RECORD
Supreme Court Docket Nos. 361 30-2009
(36 13 1-2009)
Nez Perce County District Court Nos.
2008-1 763 (2008- 1765)

A FIFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with attachments was filed
counsel for Respondents on March 5, 2010, requesting this Court for an order augmenting
Record on Appeal with the file stamped copies of the documents attached to t h s Mot
Therefore, good cause appearing,

FIFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGME
I

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents'

RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmenkation record shall include the docum,
listed below, file stamped copies of w h c h accompanied this Motion:
1. Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments with attachments, file stam
February 16,2010;
2. Defendants' Joint Memorandum in Support of Motion for Amended Judgments,
stamped February 16,2010;
3. Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amen
Judgment, file stamped February 16, 2010;
4. Reed Taylor's Response to Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments,
stamped February 25,20 10;
5. Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, file stam
March 2, 2010; and
6. Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants' Joint Mo
for Amended Judgment, file stamped March 2,201 0.

43

DATED this

1\

day of March 2010.

AUG;~~ILIA'~'ION
RECOkU
Af 3

cc:

Val.
Counsel of Record

~ t e K e nW. Kenyon, ~ % r k
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A FIFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with attachments was filed by
counsel for Respondents on March 5 , 2010, requesting this Court for an order augmenting this
Record on .Appeal with the file stamped copies of the documents attached to this Motion.
Therefore. good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' FJFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT
RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this R4otion:
1. Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments with attachments, file stamped
February 16, 201 0;
2. Defendants' Joint Memorandum in Support of Motion for Amended Judgments, file
stamped February 16.2010;
3. Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended
Judgment, file stamped February 16. 2010;
4. Reed Taylor's Response to Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, file
stamped February 25,2010;
5. Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, file stamped
March 2,20 10; and
6. Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion
for Amended Judgment, file stamped March 2,20 10.
DATED this

*
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day of March 20 10.
For the Supreme Court
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James D. LaRue ISB #I780
Jeffrey A. Thomson ISB #33801
E L M & BURKE, P.A.
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

g 31

PATTY 0. WEEKS
CLERK OF THE DIST, COURT

m@ESADAMMo#
DEPUTY

John J. Janis ISB #3599
mPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY, CHTD.
537 W. Bannock Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-75 10
Facsimile: (208) 342-2927
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Reed J. Taylor, an individual;
Case No. CV 08-0 1763
Plaintiff/Appellant,
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR
AMENDED JUDGMENTS

MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & McNICHOLS, P.A., an
Idaho professional corporation; JANE DOES 1-V,
unknown individuals,

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
PlaintifflAppellant,

I1

Case No. CV 08-01 765

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. COLLINS, a
individual; RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP,
an Idaho limited liability partnership; JANE DOES
I-X, unknown individuals;
DefendantsIRespondents.

I

DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 1

Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP by and through Jeffrey A. Thomson of Elam & Burke,
P.A., and Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., by and through John
J. Janis of Hepworth, Janis & Brody, P.A., (collectively refenred to as the "Defendant Attorneys")
move the Court, pursuant to Rule 13(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure (giving the
-

A

district courtjurisdiction to rule on any motion to amend the judgments during the pendency of
an appeal) for amended judgments in the form attached hereto.
This joint motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that:
1.

Two new Idaho Supreme Court cases have been issued during the pendency of the

appeal in this matter that appear to make premature Plaintiffs appeals fkom this Court's
Opinions and Orders on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend
Complaint and from the Judgments previously entered in these two actions (consolidated for
purposes of appeal);
2.

Any further delay in the appeals in these matters is not in the interest of any party

to these appeals, nor is it in the interest of judicial economy; and
3.

This joint motion is made to avoid a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court that

Plaintiffs appeals were premature thereby r e q u i ~ ag remand in order to allow this court to
amend the judgments in the same manner as requested by this joint motion.
The Defendant Attorneys request that this court enter amended judgments in the form
attached so that these amended judgments can be supplemented into the consolidated appellate
record and thereby perfect appellate jurisdiction over Plaintiffs appeals.
This joint motion is based upon the records, files, and pleadings in the above entitled
actions, together with a supporting memorandum and affidavit of counsel filed herewith.
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 2

DATED this

/[

day of February, 20 10.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:
orneys for Gary D. Babbitt, D. John
a h b y , Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley,
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
DATED this / O %a y of February, 20 10.
FEPWORTH JANIS & BRODY, CHTD.

By:
/$%n J. ~ d d othe
f firm

E. McNichols and
& McNichols, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the // day of February, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL
BISSELL
& KIRBY,
PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16
Spokane, Washington 9920 1

DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR A

J U.S. Mail
- Hand Delivery
Federal Express
7(509)
Facsimile Transmission
455-71 11

James D. LaRue ISB ##I780
Jeffrey A. Thomson ISB #3380
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E & B File No. 7082-0013
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

I

Case No. CV 08-0 1765
AMENDED JUDGMENT

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & H A W E Y LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, unknow
individuals;
Defendants.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint came on for
hearing before this Court on December 4,2008 and Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys'
Fees came on for hearing on February 26,2009. James D. LaRue of the firm Elam & Burke
P.A., appeared for Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A.
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 1

Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis 62 Hawley LLP. Michael S. Bissell of the law firm Campbell,
Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, appeared for Plaintiff. This Court having reviewed the record in this
matter, together with motions, memoranda, briefs and affidavits filed concerning the above
referenced motions, as well as oral argument presented by counsel, and the Court having issued
its Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, it is
hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED and Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint in its entirety
The Court also having issued its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 3, 2009, and having considered all factors in I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3) and 58(a), and in the exercise of the discretion of this Court found an award of
attorneys' fees as set forth below appropriate.
Accordingly, JUDGMENT has been entered, under the standards of Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54 and Idaho Code Sections 12-12 1,30-1-746(2) and (3), 48-608(5), in favor of
Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, against the Plaintiff in the amount of $20,058.00. This portion of
the Judgment ("the Money Judgment") has been satisfied.
DATED this -day of February, 20 10.

JEFF M. BRUDIE
District Judge

AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 201 0 , I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick 6 . Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL
BISSELL
& KIRBY,PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 9920 1

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

James D. LaRue
Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM& BURKE,
P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

John J. Janis
HEPWORTH
JANIS& BRODY,CHTD.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
CLERK OF THE COURT
By :
Deputy Clerk

AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3

John J. Janis ISB itf3599
EIEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY, CHTD.
537 W. Bannock Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-75 10
Facsimile: (208) 342-2927

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ; PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV 08-0 1763

Plaintiff,

AMENDED JUDGMENT
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & McNICHOLS, P.A.,
an Idaho professional corporation; JANE DOES
I-V, unknown individuals,
Defendants.

I

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint came on for
hearing before this Court on December 4,2008 and Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys'
Fees came on for hearing on February 26,2009. John J. Janis of the firm Hepworth, Janis &
Brody, Chtd., appeared for Defendants Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown &
McNichols, P.A. Michael S. Bissell of the law firm Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, appeared
for Plaintiff. This Court having reviewed the record in this matter, together with motions,

AMENDED JUDGMENT - 1

memoranda, briefs and affidavits filed concerning the above referenced motions, as well as oral
argument presented by counsel, and the Court having issued its Opinion and Order on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, it is hereby ORDERED that
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint in its entirety.
The Court also having issued its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 3,2009, and having considered all factors in I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3) and 58(a), and in the exercise of the discretion of this Court found an award of
attorneys' fees as set forth below appropriate.
Accordingly, JUDGMENT has been entered, under the standards of Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54 and Idaho Code Sections 12-12 1,30- 1-746(2) and (3), 48-608(5), in favor of
Defendants Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., against the
Plaintiff in the amount of $20,058.00. This portion of the Judgment ("the Money Judgment") has
been satisfied.
DATED this

day of February, 20 10.

JEFF M. BRUDIE
District Judge

AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following; in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
& KIRBY,PLLC
CAMPBELL
BISSELL
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 9920 1

-

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

James D. LaRwe
Jeffrey A. Thomson
ELAM& BURKE,P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

-

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

John J. Janis
HEPWORTH
JANIS& BRODY,CHTD.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701

-

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

CLERK OF THE COURT
By:
Deputy Clerk

AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3

J a m s D. LaRue ISB #I780
Jeffrey A. Thornson ISB #33801
ELAM & B u m , P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
John J. Janis ISB #3599
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY, CHTD.
537 W. B a o c k Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-75 10
Facsimile: (208) 342-2927
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Reed J. Taylor, an individual;
Case No. CV 08-01763
PlaintifflAppellant,
v.

DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS

MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & McNICHOLS, P.A., an
Idaho professional corporation; JANE DOES I-V,
unknown individuals,
DefendantslRespondents.
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
PlaintifflAppellant,

I
Case No. CV 08-0 1765

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. COLLINS, an
individual; RICHARD A. W E Y , an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP,
an Idaho limited liability partnership; JANE DOES
I-X, unknown individuals;
Defendants/Respondents.
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS - 1

I. INTRODUCTION
During the pendency of the consolidated appeal in these matters and prior to oral
argument (currently scheduled for April 9,2010)' the Idaho Supreme Court issued Spokane
Structures, Ine. v. Equitable Investment, LLC, 2009 Opinion No. 6, filed January 28, 2010, and
Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty 's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 20 10 Opinion No. 15, filed February 3,
2010. These two cases attempt to clarify, for court and counsel, the proper procedure for
obtaining, and the proper form, of an appealable final judgment.

In Spokane Structures, the Court determined that the original notice of appeal, appealing
from an order granting summary judgment, was premature because the order was not a final
judgment. But for a supplementation of the appellate record with a proper final judgment, the
appeal would have been remanded.

In Goodman Oil the Court determined that an earlier document was the final appealable
judgment and since Goodman Oil's appeal was not filed within forty-two (42) days of that
judgment the appeal was untimely. This led to its dismissal. This motion does not contend that
PlaintiWAppellant Taylor's appeals are untimely, just premature. However, premature appeals
do not right jurisdiction over appeals. Consequently, in order to keep the appeal on track, the
premature nature of these appeals need to be cured.

In the appeal from these matters, the PlaintiWAppellant Taylor filed Notices of Appeal
from this court's Opinions and Orders on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's

Motion

to Amend Complaint filed on December 23,2008. The Notices of Appeal were filed within
forty-two (42) days of these Opinions and Orders but, pursuant to the analysis in Spokane
Structures and Goodman Oil, these Opinions and Orders do not qualify as final appealable

DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS - 2

judgments. Neither Opinion and Order is a "separate document" stating only the relief granted or
denied. Both also contain this court's legal reasoning and analysis. Indeed, the relief granted in
the Opinions and Orders were denials of the Motions to Amend Complaint and grants of the
Motions to Dismiss, but neither order actually dismissed the Complaints.
There were Judgments entered subsequent to the Opinions and Orders, but they were
entered only after an award of attorney fees and were solely money judgments. Plaintiff;/
Appellant also filed Amended Notices of Appeal to include appeals from these judgments.
Under Spokane Structures, this would normally have cured the prematurity of the Plaintiff's
original Notices of Appeal and perfected jurisdiction. However, because neither Judgment, on its
face, states the relief granted or denied with respect to the Motions to Amend the Complaint or
the Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, the appeals from these judgments are premature.'
Pursuant to these two new cases, it appears that the Opinions and Orders and the
Judgments do not meet the Idaho Supreme Court's "clarified" final appealable judgment
analysis. Unless jurisdiction is perfected the likely result is a remand to this Court to enter the
very amendedjudgments sought by this joint motion. Since this will lead to another round of
appeals and unwanted delay, Defendant Attorneys are taking the laboring oar to perfect the
appeals by seeking these amended judgments which will then be made a part of the appellate
record, thereby giving the Idaho Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal.2

'Both judgments are money judgments for awards of attorney fees. Neither judgment
addresses the dismissal of the complaints.
*'Whileit may seem unusual that Defendant Attorneys are trying to perfect Plaintiffs
appeals, the Defendant Attorneys believe that it is in no party's best interest to m h e r delay a
decision on the merits. Moreover, it would be an extreme waste ofjudicial resources and of the
parties' time and money to go through the ministerial process of amending the judgment after it
has been remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court only to then be appealed again. Counsel for
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS - 3

Under Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(4) this court has the power and authority to rule upon
"any motion to amend the judgment". I.A.R. 13(b)(4). See also Ward v. Ltcpitlacci, I 1 1 Idaho
40,720 P.2d 223, (Ct.App. 1986) (District Court has power to enter judgment while case is on

Defendant Attorneys sought assistance from Plaintiff and his counsel to perfect Plaintiffs
appeals by stipulation but were refused. See Affidavit of Counsel, 7 4.
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS - 4

4.

On June 4,2009 Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Notice of Appeal adding and

appealing &om the Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and
Costs, Judgment entered on April 24,2009, and Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Attorney Fees) entered on June
1,2009.
5.

On February 18,2008 this appeal was consolidated with PlaintiFs appeal in the

McNichols case.
6.

On August 26,2009 a Satisfaction of Judgment was entered satisfjmg the money

judgment in the amount of $20,058.00 as fully paid, satisfied and discharged.

B.

Clements, Brown & McNichols Defendants.
1.

On December 23,2008, this Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. It contains the court's legal reasoning and
analysis and orders the following relief (1) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is hereby
DENJED; and (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
2.

On January 30,2009 Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal appealing from this

Opinion and Order. Plaintiff does so claiming that it is a "final Order".
3.

On April 24,2009 a Judgment was entered on behalf of the Clements Brown and

McNichols Defendants. The Judgment refers only to the Opinion and Order on Defendant's
Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, dated April 3,2009, and enters a money judgment

DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS - 5

in the amount of $20,058.00.3 The Judgment does not refer to nor mention the previous Opinion
and Order nor does it order the dismissal of the Complaint.
4.

On June 4,2009 Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Notice of Appeal adding and

appealing from the Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and
Costs, Judgment entered on April 24,2009, and Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Attorney Fees) entered on June
1, 2009.
5.

On February 18,2008 this appeal was consolidated with Plaintiff's appeal in the

HTEH case.
6.

On September 3,2009 a Satisfaction of Judgment was entered satisfymg the

money judgment in the amount of $20,058.00 as fully paid, satisfied and discharged.
111. ANALYSIS

This joint motion seeking amended judgments is brought at this time because of two
recent cases issued by the Idaho Supreme Court relating to that Court's subject matter
jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment, LLC, 2009
Opinion No. 6, filed January 28,2010, and Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator,

Inc., 2010 Opinion No. 15, filed February 3,2010.~These new cases stand for the proposition
that the Plaintiffs original appeals from the two Opinions and Orders on Defendants' Motion to

3Although the judgment states "TWENTY THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT AND ZERO
CENTS" the parenthetical number has a typographical error. It states "$28,058.00" but should
also read $20,058.00.
4'Whilethe time for reconsideration andlor rehearing has not yet passed on these two
cases, the pending oral arguments on Plaintiffs appeals are scheduled for April 9,2010 and
require immediate action in order to avoid sua sponte remands due to premature appeals.
DEFENDANTSyJOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS - 6

Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motions to Amend Complaint were premature and the subsequently filed
judgments were not final appealable judments and therefore did not cure the premature nature of
the original appeals. Because the Plaintiffs appeals are premature, the Idaho Supreme Court
does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeals and will likely remand the cases for entry of proper
final judgments. The joint motion seeks to avoid a remand which would lead to lengthy delays
before the merits of the appeals can be heard. By supplementing the appellate record with
amended judgments that meet the Idaho Supreme Court's new "clarified" standards and
perfecting plaintiffs appeals any W e r delays can be avoided.
A.

The Opinions and Orders on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiff's
Motions to Amend Complaint are Not Final Appealable Judgments.

In order to clarify what a final judgment is, the Court in Spokane Structures stated the
following:
As a general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment that
ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy,
and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties. It
must be a separate document that on its face states the relief
granted or denied.
Id. at p. 6, citing Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 867,55 P.3d 304, 321 (2002).

Rule 58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[elvery judgment shall be
set forth on a separate document." See I.R.C.P. 58(a).
The purpose of this rule is to eliminate confusion about when the
clock for an appeal begins to run. The separate document
requirement was also designed to eliminate uncertainty over what
actions of the district court are intended to be its judgment.
Spokane Structures at p. 5.

DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS - 7

The "separate document" requirement was discussed in Spokane Structures as follows: "For
example, a document entitled 'Order' that stated 'it is hereby ordered that the complaint is
dismissed' would constitute a judgment. It would set forth the relief to which the party was
entitled." Id. at p. 6. However, "merely typing 'It is so ordered' at the end of the memorandum
decision does not constitute a judgment." Id. "The judgment must be a separate document that
does not contain the trial court's legal reasoning or analysis." Id. The judgment that the district
court is to sign must be a document that is separate from the jury's verdict or the court's decision.

Id.
In the case at bar, the Orders and Opinions do not meeting the "separate document" test
and are therefore not final appealable orders or judgments. First, they are not a "separate
document" containing only the relief granted. They also contain this Court's legal reasoning and
analysis. Second, the Opinions and Orders do not, on their face, state the final relief granted.
Instead they state as follows:

ORDER
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is hereby DENJED.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
Opinion and Order, p. 16. Neither, as required by Spokane Structures, set forth the ultimate
relief from which the appeals have been taken, specifically that the complaints have been
dismissed. The Opinions and Orders are not final appealable judgments according to Spokane
Structures and the original appeals were premature.

B.

The Jud~mentsare Not Final Appealable Judgments as to the Dismissal of the
Complaints.
The Judgments entered by this Court in these two cases are money judgments entitling the

Defendants to attorney fees and costs. Neither Judgment dismisses the relevant complaint.
DEFENDANTSyJOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS - 8

Although the Judgments qualify as a "'separate document" as defined by Spohne Structures,
neither provide the relief to which the parties are ultimately entitled and from which the appeals
were taken (i.e., dismissal of the Complaints). See Spokane Structures, p. 5. Neither judgment
states on its face the relief granted except as to attorney fees.' The judgments, therefore, are not
final appealable judgments on the substantive issue appealed &om.
C.

Plaintiff's Appeals are Premature; A Simply Cure is Available.
Because there are no final appealable judgments in these two cases, Plaintiffs Notices of

Appeal were premature. Spokane Structures at p. 7. "Numerous civil cases in Idaho hold that a
premature notice of appeal is ineffective to vest jurisdiction on appeal." Id. citing Dept. of
Health and Welfare v. Doe, 147 Idaho 357,358-59,209 P.3d 654,655-56 (2009). Therefore,

currently the Idaho Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs appeals.
However, Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(2) provides:
A notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment, order or
decree before formal written entry of such document shall become
valid upon the filing and the placing [ofl the stamp of the clerk of
the court on such appealable judgment, order or decree, without
refiling the notice of appeal.
I.A.R. 17(e)(2). Therefore, there is a simple cure to Plaintiff's premature appeals. That cure is to
enter amended judgments and then submit the amended judgments to the appellate court. In
order to avoid fiuther delay in these already lengthy proceedings, the most efficient method for

'While the appeals from the award of attorney fees and costs may have been perfected by
these subsequent Judgments, it is highly unlikely that the appellate court would retain jurisdiction
to decide these issues while at the same time dismissing the appeal as premature on the
substantive issues. To hold otherwise would mean that the Idaho Supreme Court would decide
entitlement to attorney fees and costs without deciding which parties ultimately prevailed.
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS - 9

keeping the substantive issues before the appellate court is to enter amended judgments and
allow the parties to supplement the appellate record before the oral arguments on April 9,20 10.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Defendants respecthlly request that this Court enter the Amended Judgments in the
form attached to the joint motion.
DATED this

//

day of February, 20 10.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:

v

meys for Gary D. Babbitt, D. John
shby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley,
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP

of February, 2010.
HEPWORTH JANIS & BRODY, CHTD.

By:
Michael E. McNichols and
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,//

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 20 10, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
BISSELL
& KIRBY,PLLC
CAMPBELL
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 9920 1

JU.S. Mail
- Wand Delivery
- Federal Express
/ Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-71 1 1
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25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300
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Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
John J. Janis ISB tf3.599
HEPWORTH, JANlS & BRODY, CHTD.
537 W. Bannock Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-75 10
Facsimile: (208) 342-2927
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AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR
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STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Ada
)
Jeffrey A. Thomson, having first been duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says as
follows:
1.

I am a shareholder in the law firm of E l m & Burke, P.A., at all relevant times

counsel of record for Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP and having reviewed the contents of the file in this matter,
make this affidavit based on personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Spokane Structures, Inc.

v. Equitable Investment, LLC, 2009 [sic] Opinion No. 6, filed January 28,20 10.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Goodman Oil Co. v.

Scotty 's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 20 10 Opinion No. 165, filed February 3,20 10.
4.

I contacted Plaintiffs counsel and asked whether the Plaintiff would be willing to

stipulate to Amended Judgments in order to perfect his appeals, but the declined to do so.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this

//

day of February, 20 10.

before me this

11

dayofFebruary,2010.

n
Notary Public for Idaho
~ e s i d i at:
n~
1
My Commission Expires:

wd ,A.,Ldhm
+

.

0 111012012
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the f / day of February, 20 10, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick G . Bond
Michael S. Bissell
BISSELL
& KIRBY,PLLC
CAMPBELL
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 9920 1

J/ U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
J Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-71 11
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IN THE SUPmME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Doeket No. 35349-2008
SPOKANE STRUCTUmS, INC., a
Washington Corporation,
Plaintfff-Appellant,
v.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, LLC, an
Idaho Lidted Liability Company, a k a
SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES,
Defendant-Rapondent.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Boise, November 2009 Term
2009 Opinion No. 6
Filed: January 28,2010
~teghenW. Kenyon, Clerk

)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for Kootenai County. The Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is vacated.
,
& Holt, P.L.L.C., Coeur d'Alene, for appellant. Steven
Wetzel, ~ e t z e lGredeson
C. Wetzel argued.
Paine Hamblen LLP, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Patrick E. Miller argued.

EISMANN, Chief Justice.
This is an action to recover damages for preparing plans and specifications for a building
remodel. The parties had entered into a "DesignJBuild Agreement," but after the plaintiff
prepared the plans for the remodel, the defendant elected not to proceed with the project. The
district court granted summary judgment holding that the parties had an express contract that did
not obligate the defendant to pay any money if it elected not to proceed with the project and that
recovery under any equitable theory was precluded because of the existence of the express
contract. Because the parties did not have a binding contract, we vacate the summary judgment
and remand for further proceedings.

EXHIBIT A

1. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Equitable Investment, LLC, (Landowner) approached Spokane Structures, Inc., (Builder)
about desiping the remodel of a building into a commercial office and warehouse and then
providing the labor and materials for the remodel. The parties executed a one-page document
entitled "DesigdBuild Agreement," which provided as follows:
This agreement between SPOKANE STRUCTURES, INC. and
Systemstechnologies [sic] sets forth the scope of the work to be performed by
SPOKANE STRUCTURES, INC. in the design and construction of an office and
warehouse of approximately 7950 sq. ft. located in Hayden, Idaho. Spokane
Structures, h c . agrees to design, engineer, and draft plans in preparation of all
documentsldrawings required to enable the owner and contractor to agree on a
final design and cost of construction to be performed. As a minimum the
drawings to be prepared should include:
1. Site and location plans to determine building location and elevation, set
backs from property lines and utility locations.
2. Building foundations, slabs and sidewalks.
3. Building floor plans.
4. Schedules of doors, windows, finishes, etc.
5. Exterior building elevation to show style, forin and finish.
.
6. Building sections to show sufficient detail required to achieve style and
to show code compliance.
7. Electrical system layout.
8. Heating, air conditioning and ventilation to show all equipment and
ducting.
9. Plumbing system layout including location of all special requirements,
hose bibs, etc.
A final cost for construction will be provided upon completion of the plans and
approval from the City of Hayden Building Department. The cost for
construction is not to exceed $605,000.00, which includes all costs associated
with construction, including overhead and profit. Change orders will be handle
[sic] in writing only, and billed at cost of change plus 20% for profit and
overhead. Billing for construction will be monthly progress billing on the
percentage of completion method. This agreement is contingent upon the owners
getting fmancing. Should financing not be obtained Spokane Structures, Inc. will
be paid $5000.00 for the plans. A $2,500.00 retainer is required at signing of this
agreement.
Builder commenced working on plans for the remodel, and Landowner requested various
changes including increasing the building size by 5,000 square feet. On March 16, 2007, Builder
completed a final design incorporating those requested changes. It sent Landowner the remodel
plans along with a proposed construction contract signed by Builder under which it agreed to
complete the project for $644,092. Landowner decided not to follow through with the project.

On June 7,2007, Builder filed a complaint alleging that the DesignlBuild Agreement was
a binding contract and seeking either specific performance of the agreement or damages for
breach of conbact, unjust enrichent, quantum meruit, or promissory estoppel. Landowner filed
an answer, and on February 12, 2008, it moved for summary judgment. At the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment, the district court orally ruled that the DesignlBuild Agreement
was an unambiwous, express contract; that Landowner could not have breached the contract
because its t e r n did not obligate Landowner to do anything; and that Builder could not recover
on any equitable theories because there was an express contract.
On April 15, 2008, the district court entered an order granting Landowner's motion for
summaryjudgment.

On June 17,2008, aRer briefing and argument, the court entered an order

awarding Landowner court costs, including a reasonable attorney fee, in the sum of $14,446.75.
On May 23, 2008, Builder had filed a notice of appeal. The district court did not enter a
final judgment until June 24, 2008, and then on July 15, 2008, it entered an amended judgment
which included the award of costs.
11. ANALYSIS

A. Do We Have Jurfsdiction To Hear this Appeal?
Before we address the merits of the appeal, we will consider the effect of Builder's
premature notice of appeal. Insofar as is relevant to this case, an appeal as a matter of right
could only be taken h m a judgment, order, or decree that was fmal. I.A.R. 1l(a)(l). In this
case, Builder filed its notice of appeal before entry of the final judgment, and it stated in the
notice of appeal that it was appealing "from the Order granting summary judgment entered in the
above-entitled action on the 15th day of April, 2008." In addition, the clerk's record on appeal
was prepared and filed with this Court before the final judgment was entered, and therefore the
final judgment was not in the record on appeal. ARer this Court raised the lack of a fmal
judgment during oral argument, Landowner supplemented the record with copies of the final
judgment and the amended judgment.
At the time Builder filed its notice of appeal, the district court had entered its order
granting summary judgment. That order stated:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there
exists no issue as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment against Plaintiff be, and it is, granted and that judgment will
be entered in favor of the Defendant Equitable Investment, LLC, and against the
Plaintiff, Spokane Structures, Inc.
This order did not constitute a judgment. As we stated in In re Universe Life Insurance
Co., 144 Idaho 75 1,756, 171 P.3d 242,247 (2007), "An order granting summary judgment does
not constitute a judgment."
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides with respect to a motion for
summary judgment:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.)
The "judgment sought" is not an order granting a motion for summary judgment. The judgment
sought is a final determination of a claim or claims for relief in the lawsuit. This Rule must be
read in context with Rules 54(c) and %(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule S4(c) states that "every frnal judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled."' (Emphasis added.) The relief to which a party is entitled
is not the granting of a motion for summary judgment. The Rule refers to the relief to which the
party is ultimately entitled in the lawsuit, or with respect to a claim in the l a ~ s u i t The
. ~ granting
of the motion for summary judgment is simply a procedural step towards the party obtaining that
relief.
The "relief to which the party . . . is entitled" must be read in connection with other rules.
Rule 8(a)(l) provides, "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief. . . shall contain . . . (2) a

I

Rule 54(c) states in full:
A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed
for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
If there is more than one claim in a lawsuit, a judgment on one claim would not be a final judgment unless it was
certified as final under Rule 54(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or judgment had already been entered on
the other claim@).

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled."The "demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled" obviously refers to the relief that the
party seeks in the lawsuit. For example, neither the Builder in its complaint nor the Landowner
in its answer prayed for the granting of a motion for summary judgment. In this case, the relief
sought by Builder was either specific performance of the DesigdBuild Agreement or damages,
and the relief sought by Landowner was dismissal of Builder's complaint. The relief to which a
party is entitled is the specific redress or remedy that the court determines the party should
receive in the litigation, or with respect to a claim for relief in the litigation.
Rule 58(a) requires that "[elvery judgment shall be set forth on a separate document."
That requirement was added to the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1992. Hunting v. Clark County
School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634,637,93 1 P.2d 628,63 1 (1997). "The purpose of this rule is
to eliminate confbsion about when the clock for an appeal begins to m. The separate document
requirement was also designed to eliminate uncertainty over what actions of the district court are
intended to be its judgment."46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 8 70 (2006) (footnotes omitted). Thus,
in Hunting, 129 Idaho at 637, 931 P.2d at 631, we held that an "'Order Granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment,' stating that "pllaintiffs complaint is dismissed with
prejudice"' was not a judgment that started the running of the time for appeal because it was not
a separate document.
Unfortunately, this Court has at times contributed to the confbsion by focusing upon
whether the document "adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a frnal
determination of the rights of the parties," Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,641,991 P.2d 362,
366 (1999), without also requiring that it be "a separate document" that "grant[s'J the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled," I.R.C.P. Rules 58(a) & 54(c). Thus, in
Davis v. Peacock we held that there was a final judgment even though "it does not appear that
the district court ever expressly dismissed or ruled on Peacock's counterclaim." 133 Idaho at
640, 991 P.2d at 365. Similarly, in Scaggs v. Mutual of Enurnclaw Insurance Co., 141 Idaho
114, 117, 106 P.3d 440, 443 (2005), we held that a "Decision and Order" was a final judgment
even though the order was not a separate document. At the end of the five-page written decision,
the district court had merely typed, "It is so ordered."

In order to clarify what a final judgment is, we restate: "As a general rule, a final
judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the
controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties. It must be a
separate document that on its face states the relief granted or denied." Camp v. East Fork Ditch

Co., 137 Idaho 850, 867, 55 P.3d 304, 321 (2002) (citations omitted). Although it would be
better practice to entitle the document "Judgment"in order to avoid any confbsion, the title is not
determinative. "Whether an instrument is an appealable order or judgment must be determined
by its content and substance, and not by its title." Id. For example, a document entitled "Order'"
that stated "It is hereby ordered that the complaint is dismissed" would constitute a judgment. It
would set forth the relief to which the party was entitled.
Obviously, however, merely typing "It is so ordered'" at the end of a memorandum
decision does not constitute a judgment. The judgment must be a separate document that does
not contain the trial court's legal reasoning or analysis. Rule 58(a)(l) provides that a trial court
'"hall sign the judgment" "upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by the court that a
party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied." Likewise, Rule
58(a)(2) states that the trial court "shall approve the form and sign the judgment" "upon a
decision by the court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict
accompanied by answers to interr~~atories."~
Obviously, the judgment that the court is to sign
must be a document that is separate from the jury's verdict or the court's decision. Similarly,
Rule 54(d)(S) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shows that the jury verdict or a decision of
the court is not the same as a judgment. That Rule provides:

' Rule %(a) provides:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): (1) upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a
decision by the court that a party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be
denied, the court shall sign the judgment and the judgment shall be entered by the judge or clerk;
(2) upon a decision by the court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict
accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the court shall approve the form and sign the
judgment, and the judgment shall be entered by the judge or the clerk. Every judgment shall be
set forth on a separate document. The filing of a judgment by the court as provided in Rule 5(e) or
the placing of the clerk's filing stamp on the judgment constitutes the e n 6 of the judgment; and
the judgment is not effective before such entry. The entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for
the taxing of costs. The entry of judgment shall not be made in a divorce or annulment action
unless and until the prevailing party fwllishes to the clerk a completed certificate of divorce or
annulment on a form fwllished by the department of vital statistics.. In addition, entry ofjudgment
shall not be made as to any decree that contains the obligation for one party to pay child support
unless and until it is accompanied by the completed transmittal form to the Department of Health
and Welfare.

At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party
who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs,
itemizing each claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be filed
later than fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment.
Because the memorandum of costs is to be filed ''after . . . a decision of the court" but not later
than "fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment," the "decision of the court" resolving the
lawsuit and the "judgment" must be two different documents,

In this case, the district court signed an order granting summary judgment and an order
awarding court costs, but it did not then sign a separate document that would constitute a
judgment until one month afler Builder had filed its notice of appeal. Thus, Builder's notice of
appeal was premature. "Numerous civil cases in Idaho hold that a premature notice of appeal is
ineffective to vest jurisdiction on appeal." Department of Health & Werfare v. Doe, 147 Idaho
357, 358-59, 209 P.3d 654, 655-56 (2009). However, Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(2) provides,
"A notice of appeal filed fkom an appealable judgment, order or decree before formal written
entry of such document shall become valid upon the filing and the placing the stamp of the clerk
of the court on such appealable judgment, order or decree, without refiling the notice of appeal."
Since the district court's grant of Landowner's motion for summary judgment resolved all of the
substantive issues in this case, we hold that Builder's premature notice of appeal became valid
upon the entry of the frnal judgment on June 24, 2008. We therefore have jurisdiction to hear
this appeal. See Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian Athletic Ass 'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509,
51 1,670 P.2d 1294, 1296 (1983).

B. Did the District Court Err in Dismissing the Complaint?
The district court held that the Desigm'Build Agreement was an express contract; that
Landowner did not breach the contract because it did not obligate Landowner to do anything;
and that the express contract barred Builder's equitable claims. The district court erred in
holding that the Desigm'Build Agreement was a contract.
During oral argument on appeal, both parties admitted that the DesignlBuild Agreement
was not a binding contract because it was merely an agreement to agree. "It is essential to an
enforceable contract that it be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and requirements so
that it can be determined what acts are to be performed and when performance is complete."

Dale's Service Co., Inc. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 664, 534 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975). Under the
DesignfBuild Agreement, the parties left for future agreement both the plans and specifications
describing the scope of the work to be done and the contract price, which were essential,
interrelated terms. "No enforceable contract comes into being when parties leave a material term
for future negotiations, creating a mere agreement to agree." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc.,
141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974,984 (2005) (quoting from 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts
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(2004)). Therefore, we vacate the judgment, the award of costs and attorney fees, and the order
granting summary judgment.

C. Is Builder Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to Idaho
Code 12-120(3)?
Builder seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code

8

12-120(3).

That statute provides for the awarding of a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in
various types of civil actions. Because we do not yet know who will prevail in this action, any
detemination of the prevailing party is premature. City of McCaZI v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,
667, 201 P.3d 629, 640 (2009). If the district court on remand determines that Builder is the
prevailing party in this action, it may award Builder attorney fees for this appeal. Lexington
Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276,287,92 P.3d 526,537 (2004).

111. CONCLUSION
We vacate the judgments of the district court, the order awarding costs and attorney fees,
and the order granting summary judgment. We remand this case for further proceedings that are
consistent with this opinion. We award appellant costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal.
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.
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W. .JONES, Justice
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 2, 1995, one of the Respondents, Bart McKnight, on behalf of Scotty's DuroBuilt Generator, Inc., entered into a Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement (Vacation
Agreement) with Appellant, Goodman Oil Company, and two other parties. In the Vacation
Agreement, tlie parties consented to the vacation of a portion of First Avenue South by the City
of Nampa, Idaho. The Vacation Agreement also stipulated "[tlhat the parties shall klly
cooperate to ensure that the purpose and intent of this Agreement shall be accomplished.'"
On July 28, 2004, Goodman Oil entered into a contract with James Wylie whereby
Goodman Oil agreed to sell its property to Wylie for $600,000, However, the sale was
contingent upon the vacation of First Avenue South in a manner that was satisfactory to both
Goodman Oil and Wylie. Wylie submitted development plans for Goodman Oil's property, and
on Aupst 4, 2004, the Nampa Fire Department gave their written approval.

The Fire

1

EXHIBIT B

Depament approved the vacation of First Avenue South subject to the dedication of a twentyfoot wide fire apparatus access road easement and conditioned upon Wylie obtaining consent
fram adjoining property owners.
On August 16, 2004, Ordinance No. 3374 (the Ordinance) watt approved by the Nnmpa
City Council and by the Mayor, which was necessary for the vacation of First Avenue South to
occur. Respondent Bart McKnight spoke with the Mayor and voiced his objection to the
vacation, and the Mayor, after. approving the Odinance, later vetoed the Ordinance.
Consequently, the Ordinance was not published and did not become law, and as a result, the
vacation failed.
Goodman Oil argues that because the vacation did not occur, Goodman Oil's land sale to
Wylie failed. Goodman Oil subsequently filed a complaint against Duro-Bilt; Bart McKnight,
the owner of Duro-Bilt; and Alane McKnight, Bart's wife, collectively referred to in this Opinion
as Duro-Bilt, aserting four claims in its complaint: count I, breach of contract; count 11, tortious
interference with a purchase and sale agreement; count 111, negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage; and count IV, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage. The breach of contract claim was for the alleged breach of the Vacation
Agreement, and the tort claims were for the alleged interference with the land sale contract
between Goodman Oil and Wylie,
Dmro-Bilt filed a motion for summary judgment on June 29, 2006, and the district comt,
on September 19, 2006, entered an order dismissing Bart and Alane NcKnight, in their
individual capacities, from the case. Goodman Oil filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order; however, Goodman Oil's motion for reconsideration was denied on November 7,2006. In
addition, on the same day, the district court entered an order dismissing count 11, totious
interference with a puxcllase and sale agreement; count 111, negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage; and count IV, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage.

Duro-BiIt subsequently filed a second motion for summary judgment,

and on February 6,2007, the district court granted summary judgment dismissing count I, breach
of contract. Goodman Oil filed a motion for reconsideration, and on April 2, 2007, the district
court denied Goodman Oil's motion. In addition, that same day, the district court awarded DuroBilt and Bart and Alane McKnight attorney fees and costs under I.C. fj 12-121, and the district
7,2007, entered an order which set the amount of attorney fees and costs owed,
court, on Aug~~st

On October 16, 2007, Goodman Oil moved the district court to enter a final judgment.
The district court denied Goodman Oil's motion, and Goodman Oil filed a notice of appeal on
November 23,2007

,

ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Whether Goodman Oil's notice of appeal was timely.

11.

Whether the district court erred when disn~issingBart and Alane McKnight from the
case.

111.

Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on all counts.

N

Whether the district court ened in awarding attorney fees and costs to Duro-Bilt and Bart
and Alane M c f i i g h t

V.

Whether this Court should award attorney fees and costs to either Goodman Oil or DuroBiIt on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court exercises free review over questions of subject-matter jurisdiction. Slate v.
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,483,80 P.3d 1083,1084 (2003)-

I.

DISCUSSION
This Court llolds that Goodman Oil's notice of appeal was untimely.
On February 2, 2007, as stated above, the district court executed an order granting

summary judgment for Duro-Bilt on Goodman Oil's last remaining claim, breach of contmct.
Goodman Oil filed a motion for reconsideration on Febmary 2.3, 2007, and the district court
entered an order denying Goodman Oil's motion on April 2,2007. Goodman Oil and Duro-Bilt
dispute whether, under I.A.R. 14(a), the allotted forty-two days for Goodman Oil to file a notice
of appeal began to mn on April 2,2007, the date the final order not concerning attorney fees
were entered. Under 1.A.R 14(a), a notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two days of a
district court's judgment that is appealable as a matter of right.
Goodman Oil claims that the district court's April 2,2007, order did not trigger the fortytwo day time limit because it was not a judgment and it was not set forth in a separate document.
In forming its argument, Goodman Oil relies upon I.R.C.P. 58(a), which states: "Every judgment
shall be set forth on a separate document." Goodman Oil also cites the Supreme Court Rules
Committee's explanation for the separate document requirement, which states that a separate
document is needed in order to eliminate confirsion and so that all parties know when the time
for appeal has begun. In addition, Goodman Oil argues that 1.R.C.P. %(a) has been interpreted
in Htrrrtiirg v. Clark Cotritty Scltool Dist., 129 Idaho 6.34, 931 P.2d 628 (1997), Cnnrp v. East
3

Fork Ditch Co,, Ltd , 137 Idaho 850, 55 P-3d 304 (2002), and bt re U~tiverseL@ Itis. Co., 144
Ida110 571, 171 P.3d 242 (2007), wherein this Court found that an order granting summary
judgment was insufficient to constitute a final judgment under I.R.C.P. 58(a) because it was not
entitled "judgment" and had not been entered in a separate document
Duto-Bilt argues that the appeal is barred because Goodman Oil did not file a notice of
appeal within forty-two days of April 2, 2007, the date the district court: disposed with the last
issue not concerning attorney fees. Duro-Bilt claims that the requirement that "[elvery judgment
shall be set forth in a separate documen4" as stated in I.R.C.P. 58(a), was satisfied on April 2,
2007. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a), Duro-Bilt argues, states that a "'lj]udgment' as used
in these rules includes a decree and any order &om which an appeal lies." In addition, Duro-Bilt
claims tllat I.A.R. 11(a)(l) states that an appeal as a matter of right may be taken from a final
judpent, order, or decree. This Court, Durn-Bilt argues, llas also held that "a final judgment is
an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and
represents a final determination of tlte rights of the parties." C4tq7, 137 Idaho at 867,55 P.3d at
321 Duro-Bilt argues that the order issued April 2, 200'7, denying Goodman Oil's motion for
reconsideration, meets the definition of "final judgmenti' because no other issues were left to be
decided. Duro-Bilt argues, thus, because the order amounted to a final judgment, Goodman Oil
could have appealed as a matter of right, and because the order was appealable, the order
amounted to a "judgment," as defined under I.R.C.P. 54(a).

Because the order was a

"judgment,"under the definition of 'tjudgment" in 1.A-R. 14(a), Goodman Oil was required to
file a notice of appeal within forty-two days of the date the order was entered. In addition, DuroBilt argues that the April 2, 2007, order satisfied the "separate document" requirement, as
required under I.R.C.P. 58(a), because the order was a separate document.
This Court recognizes that there has been some confusion as to when the forty-two day
time limit is triggered under l.A R. 14(a), and in 1992, it tried to eliminate confusion by adding
an additional sentence to I.R.C.P, 58(a), which deals with the method of an entry of judgment.
The amendment states: "Every judgment sl~allbe set forth on a separate document."

Id

However, this Court is aware that I.R.C.P. %(a) says nothing about the time to appeal and that
there is still confusion as to when the forty-two day time limit begins to run. This Court takes
this opportunity to hopefully bring an end to the confusion.
This Court l~oldsthat the forty-two day period to file a notice of appeal begins to run
once an order is entered that resolves all issues, grants all relief to which the prevailing party is

entitled other than attorney fees and costs, and brings an end to a lawsuit. It does not matter
whether the order is entitled, judpent, order, or declee. Consequently, Gooding Oil's notice of
appeal was untimely because the district court entered an order on April 2,2007, disposing with
the last non-attorney fee issue in the case, and Goodman Oil did not file a notice of appeal until
November 23,2007, more than six months after the order was entered.
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within forty-two days
of "any jtldgtaetrt, or& or decree of the district court [that is] appealable as a matter of right in
any civil . . . action."

(emphasis added). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) shtes what

constitutes an entry of a judgment: "[Ulpon a decision by the court granting other relief
C O U shall
~

. . the

approve the form and sign the judgment, and the judgment shalI be entered by the

judge or the clerk* Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document."
Application of a tl~ree-stepprocess leads to the conclusion that an order that grants all
relief requested other than costs and attorney fees constitutes a "judgment" under 1.R.C-P.58(a);
and as a result, the order triggers the forty-two day time limit under I.A.R. 14(a). First, I.R.C.P.

54(a) states, "'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies." Second, 1.A.R I l(a)(l) states when an appeal lies; I.A.R. 1l(a)(l) states that an
appeal as a matter of right may be taken fram judgments, orders, and decrees which are final,
Lastly, this Court has defined what constitutes a final order or judgment- This Court has held
that "[als a general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit,
adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the
rights of the parties." Canp, 137 Idaho at 867,55 P 3d at 321. Therefote, because an order that
brings an end to a lawsuit other than issues of costs and attorney fees constitutes a final
judgment, i d , and an appeal as a matter of light may be taken fiom a final judgment, 1.A.R
1l(a)(l), an order that brings an end to a lawsuit constitutes a "judgment." I R.C.P. 54(a).
This holding is in line with recent decisions by this Court. In Sltelto~iv. Sl~elioa,No,
35854-2008, 2009 WL. 4093724, at 3 (Idaho Nov. 27, 2009), this Court held that an order
granting a motion to dismiss was a final order, and accordingly, the time to appeal began to run
when the order was entered. Likewise, this Court in B K /)rientzort)~tai)r
Hospital, hc.,

Y,

Ada

Cotlnry, 35904, 2009 WL 4263558, at 1 (Idaho Dec. 1, 2009), held that a magistrate's order
constituted a final judgment, and consequently, because a notice of appeal was not filed within
the requisite number of days from the order; this Court held that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. In addition, the foregoing application of I.A.R. 14 and

1,R.C.P.58(a) promotes the best interest of the parties, as it promotes finality and closure in the
litigation process.
Goodman Oil also argues that 1,R.C.P. 58(a) requires a judgment to be entered on a
separate document. n t i s Court finds that the order entered by the district cot~rton April 2,2007,
has satisfied the requirement, as the order was a separate document and was a judgment under
the definition of I.R,C,P. 54(a). Since this Court found Gooding Oil's appeal to be untimely, the

temaining issues need not be considered on appeal.
11.

This Court awards attorney fees and costs to Duro-Bilt and Bart and Alane
Memight on appeal.
This Court @ants Duro-Bilt's request for costs and attorney fees under I.C. (i 12-120(3).

Attorney fees are to be awarded under LC. 5 12-120(3) to the prevailing party in an action
arising out of a commercial transaction. In this case, the Vacation Agreement was integral to
Goodman Oil's lawsuit against Duro-Bilt; without the Agreement, the lawsuit would not have
been brought.. Brotver v. 8.1 DtiPotrt De Ne~~rotirs
mtti Co , 117 Idaho 780, 784,792 P.2d 345,
349 (1990) (stating that attorney fees are appropriate under I.C. (i 12-120(3) when the
commercial transaction is integral to the claim.) The Agreement's central nature to the claim is
also apparent by the fact that the same action by Duro-Bilt brought about both the tort and breach
of contract claims. Each arose out of Duro-Bilt's objection to the vacation of First Avenue
South. Accordingly, costs and attorney fees are to be awarded to Duro-Bilt, the prevailing party.
Goodman Oil argues that it is entitled to attorney fees under LC.12-120(3) if it prevails
on appeal. Since Goodman Oil has not prevailed, no fees are awarded,

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that Goodman Oil's notice of appeal was
untimely. This Court awards attorney fees to Duro-Bilt and Bart and Alane McKnight on appeal.
The temaining issues need not be considered on appeal. Costs are awarded to Durn-Bilt and Bart
and Alane McKnight.
.Justices BURDICK, HORTON and Justices pro teltt TROUT and IUDWEL.L CONCUR.
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P. 1

Plaintiff-Appellant, Reed J. Taylor, by and through

attorneys, Michael S. Bissell and

Roderick C. Bond of Campbell, Bisscll & Kirby, PLLC, submits this Response to Defendants'
Joint Motion for Amended Judgment:

I. INTKODIJCTION
Despite requests from the undersigned counsel, the defendants' counsel will not explain
why "Amended Judgments" are required in the form and manner submitted, except to "ripen" the
appeal. Of course. when clear questions are not answered by the defendants' counsel, it becomes
obvious why Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to their proposed "Amended Judgments."
Curiously, the defendants argue on one hand that there are no final judgments. Yet, on the other
hand, the defendants submitted proposed "Amended Judgments" for the court to sign and
included other substantial language that is not in accord with the I d d ~ oRules of Civil Procedure.

11. LEGAL AUTHORITY

A. The "Amended Judpments" are not required as the court's orders were
appealable orders.
An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and denying a motion to amend are an appealable orders. See Goodmun

Oil Cornpcmy v. Scolly '.T Dzrro-Rilt Generuror. Inc., 20 10 WI, 366704 *3-4 (Idaho 20 10);
I.K.C.P. 54(a); 1.K.C.I'. %(a); I.A.K. I l(a)(l).
On Dccembcr 23, 2008, the court entered its opinion and orders granting the defendants'
Motions to Dismiss and denying Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. Although Recd Taylor
contends that the court did not address a number of his arguments and claims, the opinions and
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orders were appealable orders. and Reed Taylor timely appealed those orders.

R. r i s s u m i n ~ Defendants' ar~uinents are correct, their proposed "Amended
.Judgmentsv are not appropriate and violate the Rules of Civil Procedure.
1 . Even if the defendants are correct, no judgments may be amended nfter 14
days from entry.

A motion to alter or arncnd a judgment must be braught within 14 days of the date of any
.judgment. I.R.C.P. 59(e).
Defendants content that there are no final jud~ments and curiously submit, without
explanation, proposed "Amended Judgments." If, as the defendants contend, a fornlal judgment

is necessary and that a judgment was never entered, then there would be no "Amended
Judgments" as there were never any judgments to begin with. As for including the attorneys'
fees and costs judgments within their "Proposed Amended Judgments," the time has long passed
to amend those judgments, assuming they are not void under the defendants' arguments.
Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, then only a judgment may be cntcred, not
an amended judgment and not addressing issues of fees arid costs or the satisfaction of any
.judgments, piuticularly when those judgments would be void under the defendants' rationale.
2. Even if the defendants are correct, the judgments must be a separnte
document.
"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document."

I.R.C.P. %(a).

"A

judgment slzall not contain a recital of pleadings. . ." I.R.C.P. 54(a).
Thus, it would be wholly inappropriate to include any language regarding the pleadings,
affidavits or other information considered. particularly when certain pleadings and affidavits
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referenced in the proposed "Atncnded Judgments" were never submitted or relied up011 the court
to render its decision on the Motions to Ilismiss and Motions to Amend.
'T'hus, if the dcfcndants' arguments are correct, ally judgment should be a separate
document, should not recite pleadings, should conform to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
and should not be based upon the language in the proposed Amendcd Judgments,
3. Even if the defendants are correct, language should be included in the
.Judgment stating that they do nut include claims or causes of action which
accrued after October 15,2008.

Reed Taylor filed his Motions to Amend and Supplement Complaints on October 15,
2008. If the court enters any new, revised or amended judgments or orders, thcn the court should
insert language in the judgments or orders stating that they do not bar claims or causes of action
which accrued after October 15, 2008.
4. Even if the defendants are correct and the court enters new, revised or
amended judgments, the award of attorneys' fees was premature as there
w i ~ sno final judgment under the defendants' theory.

If the defendants' theory is correct, then the award of any attorneys' fees and costs would
have been premature as there was no final judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(U). Without a final
judgment, there can be no prevailing party under Rule 54 and il I'ollows that the judgments
entered awarding attorneys' fees and costs are void. I.K.C.1'. 60(b)(4).
Therefore. Reed I'aylor requests that the court order the defendants to pay the $20,058
previously tendered to them by Reed Taylor to avoid execution into the clerk of the court
purs~rantto I.C. Cj 10-1 115. If so ordered, Reed 'I'aylor would stipulate that a new judgment
could be entered on the award of attorneys' fees and costs so long as the judgment is worded

identical to the prior judgments and is based upon the identical reasons without the necessity of
requiting the court to hold new hearings on the issue of fees and costs. If the defendants refuse
to pay the $20,058 (a total of $40,116) the court clerk, then Reed Taylor requests that the court
order the defendants to entcrjudgment in favor of Reed Taylor for thc $40,116 owed to him.
5. If the defendants are correct, then a satisfaction of judgment cannot be
entered by the court and must be a separate document.
A satisfaction of a judgment may only be entered by a party, the party's attorney or the
court clerk. I.R.C.P. 58(b); I.C.

fi 10-1 115. A judgment must be on a separate document.

I.R.C.P. 58(a).
'l'hus, even if the defendants' arguments are correct, a satisfaction of judgment may not
be entered by the court and should not be included in any judgment or order. Rather. any
satisfaction of judgment should only be entered by the in accordance with I.C.

5 10-1 115.

I-lowever, if the defendants do not agree to promptly pay the $20,058 to the court clerk, then no
satisfaction of judgment should be entered by the court clerk and the court should enter a
judgment in favor of Reed Taylor in the amount of $20,058 for each action.
6. If the defendants are correct, the language in the judgments should stated
that his "Complaints" were dismissed and not his "Amended Complaints" as
asserted in the proposed Amended Judgments.

111 their proposed "Amended Judgments," the defendants asserted Ianguage stating that
"JUD(;MENPI' is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in its entirety."
See Proposed Amended Judgments, p. 2 (underlined emphasis added).

if the defendants'

arguments are correct, then the judgments or orders entered by the court should only reference

KI~SI'ONSl~
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--

"Complaints" and not "Amended Complaints" as Reed Taylor's Amended Complaints were
never filed.'

7. The defendants fail to address the above issues and fail to submit any
explanation why their proposed "Amended Judgments" are titled as such
and contains other questionable and/or inappropriate language.
The defendants never answered questions several issues and questions posed by Reed
Taylor's counsel in their Joint Motions or othenvise.
"Amended Judgments" instead of "Judgments"?

Why are the defendants proposing

Why are the defendants including the

attorneys' fees judgments in the "Amended .ludgmentsm? Why are the defendants including
satisfaction ofjudgments in the "Amended Judgments"? Why have the defendants' worded their
proposed Amended Judgments in the manner worded in light of the arguments asserted above
and the Rules of Civil Procedure addressed above?

Why did the defendants not limit the

language in their proposed "Amended Judgments" to only claims and causes of action which had
accrued through October 23, 2008?

It is not surprising thal Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to the proposed
"Amended Judgments" in light of the issues presented above and above unanswered questions.
DATED this 25thday February, 2010.

MTCIIAEI, S. BISSELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

'

Counsel for the defcnda~itshave acknowlcdged that "Amended" Complaints should not be included in
their proposed "Amended Judgments." However, this argument is being asserted to prcservc thc objection.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:

I IiEI.tEJ3Y GER'TTPV that on the 25" hay of February, 20 10. I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of tllc foregoing, postage prepaid (if applicable), to the following parties:

IIAND DELIVERY
iJ.S. MAIL
ClVI<KNIGH1' MAIL
FAX 7'KAN SMISSION
EMAIT, (.ptif al-lachmcnt)

-

-

IEANU DELIVERY
IJ.S. MATI,
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Y

.John J. .ranis
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Plaintiff-Appellant, Reed J. Taylor, by and through his attorneys, Michael S. Bissell and
Roderick C. Bond of Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PT,I.C, submits this Response to Defendants'
Joint Motion for Amended Judgment:

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite requests from the undersigned counsel, the defendants' counsel will not explain
why "Amended Judgments" are required in the form and manner submitted, except to "ripen" the
appeal. Of course, when clear questions are not answered by the defendants' counsel, it becomcs
obvious why Reed 7'aylor would not agree to stipulate Lo their proposed "Amended Judgments."
Curiously, the defcnd'mts argue on one hand that there are no final judgments. Yet, on the other
hand, the defendants submitted proposed "Amended Judgments" for the court to sign and
included othcr substantial language that is not in accord with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
11. LEGAL AUTHORITY

A, The "Amended Judvrnents" are not requircd as the court's orders were
appealable orders.

An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and denying a motion to amcnd are an appealable orders. See Goodman

Oil C,'ompany v. Scoffy's Durn-Bill C;enernfor, Inc., 201 0 WL 366704 *3-4 (Idaho 201 0);
I.R.C.P. 54(a); I.R.C.P. 58(a); I.A.R. I l(a)(l).
On December 23, 2008, the court entcred its opinion and orders granting the defendants'
Motions to Dismiss and denying Rced 'l'aylor's Motions to Amend. Although Reed Taylor
contends that the court did not address a number of his arguments and claims, the opinions m d

RESI'ONSE '1'0 IIEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 2

orders wcrc appealable orders, m d Reed 'T'aylor timely appealcd those orders.

B. Assuming Defendants' arpun~ents are correct, their proposed "Amended
Judgments" are not appropriate and violate the Rules of Civil Procedure.

1 . Even if the defendants are correct, no judgments may be amended after 14
days from entry.

A motion to alter or m e n d a judgment must be brought within 14 days of thc date of ally
judgment. I.R.C.P. 59(e).
llefendants content that there are no final judgments and curiously submit, without
explanation, proposed "Amended Judgments." If, as the defendants contend, a formal judgment
is necessary and that a judgment was never entered, then there would be no "Amended
Judgments" as there wcrc never any judglnents to begin with. As for including the attorneys'
fees and costs judgments within thcir "Proposed Amended Judgments," the time has long passed
to amend those judgments, assuming they are not void under the defendants' arguments.
Thus, if the dcfcndants' zgumcnts are correct, then only a judgment may be entered, not
a.11

amended judgment and not adbessing issucs of fees and costs or the satisfaction of any

.judgments, particularly when those judgments would be void under the dcfcndants' rationale.
2. Even if the defendants are correct, the judgments must be a separate
document,

"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document."
judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings.

. ."

I.R.C.P. 58(a).

"A

I.R.C.P. 54(a).

Thus, it would be wholly inapproprii~teto include any language regarding the pleadings,
affidavits or other information considercd, particularly when certain pleadings and affidavits
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referenced in the proposed "Amended Judgments" were never submitted or relied upon the court
to render its decision on the Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Amend.
Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, any judgment should be a separate
documcnl, should not recite pleadings, should conform to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,

and strnuld not be based upon the language in the proposed Anlcnded Judgments.
3. Even if the defendants arc correct, language should be included in the
Judgment stating that they do not include claims or causes of nction which
accrued after October 15,2008.
Reed 'I'aylor filed his Motions to Amend and Supplenient Complaints on October 15,

2008. If the court enters any new, reviscd or amended judgments or orders, then the court should
insert language in the judgments or orders stating that they do not bar claims or causes of action
which accrued after October 15, 2008.

4. Even if the defendants are correct and the court enters new, revised or
amended judgments, the award of attorneys' fees was premature as there
wns no final judgment under the defendants' theory.
If the defendants' theory is correct, then the award of any attorneys' fees and costs would
have been premature as there was no final judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(I)(B). Witllout a Gnal
judgment, there can be no prevailing party under Rule 54 and it follows that the judgments
cntercd awarding attorneys' fees arid costs are void. J.R.C.P. 60(b)(4).
l'herefore, Reed Taylor requests that the court order the defendants to pay the $20,058
previously tendered to them by Reed 'I'aylor to avoid execution into the clerk of the court
pursuant to 1.C. tj 10- 1 1 15. If so ordered, Reed Taylor would stipulate that a new judgment
could be entered

011 the

award of' attorneys' lkes and costs so long as the judgment is worded
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identical to the prior judgments and is based upon the identical reasons without the necessity of

requiring the court to hold new Ilearings on the issue of fees and costs. If the defendants refuse
to pay the $20,058 (a total of $40,1 16) the court clerk, then Reed Taylor requests that the court
order the dei'endants to enter judgment in favor of Reed Taylor for the $40,116 owed to him,
5. If the defendants are correct, then a satisfaction of judgment cannot be
entercd by the court and must be a separate document,

it satisfaction of a judgment may only be entercd by a party, the party's attorney or the
court clerk. I.R.C.P. 58(b); 1.C.

10-1 115. A judgmcnt must be on a separate document.

I.R.C.P. %(a).
Thus, even if the defendants' arguments are correct, a satisfaction of judgrncnt may not
be entered by the court and should not be included in any judgment or order. Rather, m y
satisfaction of judgment should only be entered by the in accordance with I.C. $ 10-1 115.
IIowever, if the defendants do not agree to promptly pay the $20,058 to the court clerk, then no
satisfaction of judgment shc)uld be entered by the court clerk and the court should entcr a
,judgment in favor of Reed Taylor in the m o u n t of $20,058 for each action.

6. If the defendants are correct, the language in the judgments should stated
that his "Complaints" were dismissed and not his "Amendcd Complaints" as
asserted in the proposed Amended Judgments.
In their proposed "Amended Judgments," the defendants asserted language stating that
"JiJl>(jMF.NT is hereby entered DTSMISSTNG Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in its cntircty."
See Proposcd Amended Judgments, p. 2 (underlined emphasis added).

If the defendants'

arguments are correct, then the judgnlcnts or orders entercd by the court should only rcl'ercnce
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"Complaints" arid not "Amended Complaints" as Reed 'I'aylor's Atncnded Complaints were
ncvcr filed.'
7. The defendants fail to address the above issucv and fail to submit any
explanation why thcir proposed "Amended Judgments" are titled as such
and contains other questionable and/or inappropriate Innguage.
The defendants never answered qucstions several issues and questions posed by Reed
Taylor's counscl in their Joint Motions or otherwise.
"Amended Judgments" instead of "Judgments"'?

Why arc the defenda1.1ts proposing

Why are the defendants including the

attorneys' fecs judgments in the "Amended Judgments"?

Why are the dcfcndants including

satisfaction ofjudgments in thc "Amended Judgments"? Why have the defendants' worded their
proposed Amended Judgments in the manner worded in light of the arguments asserted above
and the Rulcs of Civil Procedure addressed above'?

Why did the defendants not limit the

language in their proposed "Amendcd Judgments" to only claims and causes of action which hnti
accrued through Octobcr 23,2008?
It is not surprising that Reed Taylor would not agrec to stipulate to the proposed
"Amended Judgments" in light of thc issues prescnted above and above unanswered qucstions.
DATTID this 25thday February, 20 10.
CAMPBELL. B I S S ~ I&, KIRBY, PLLC

RODE RICK^

BOND
MICIIAEL ,l31SSEI,T,
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

'

Counsel for the defendants have acknowledged that "Amended" Complaints should not be included in
their proposed "Amended Judgtnents." However, this sirgunlent is being asserted to preservc the objection.
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CEKTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I IIERE23.Y CERTIFY that on the 25'" day of February, 201 0 , l caused to be served a true
and correct copy ofrhc foregoing, postage prepaid (if applicable), to the t'ollowing partics:

--

l IAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OV EKNICfH?' MATI,
FAX 'TRANSMISSION
EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

3o11n J. Janis
Hepwonh, Janis & Rrody, C'htd.
13.C). Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

I IAND IIELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAII,
FAX 'TRANSMISSION
IiMAll, (.pdf attachment)

Jarnes 13. T,aTZue
Jeffrey A. 'I-liomson
t.',lan-t & Burke, PA
1'.0.Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704

'/<
'x
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Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F THE
STATE O F IDAHO, IN AND F( . THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Reed J. Taylor, an individual;
Case No. CV 08-0 1763

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS

MICHAEL E. McNICI-IOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A., an
ldaho professional corporation; JANE DOES I -V,
unknown individuals,

I

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;

Case N o CV 08-01765

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASI-IBY, an individual; PA'I'RICK V. COLLINS, an
individual; IIICtlARD A. RILXY, an individual;
I IAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & t IAWLEY LLP,
an ldaho limited liability partnership; JANE DOES
I-X, unknown it~dividuals;
De fendants/Responden ts.

1

Ittl'LY IN SUI'POK I: OF DEf:f',NDAN'I'S' J O I N T
hlO'I'ION FOR AICtENDED JUDCilClEN'I'S - I

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff/Appellant Reed J. 'Taylor ("'Taylor") has refi~sedto stipulate and now has
opposed Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments even though the purpose of the
motion is to ripen Taylor's premature appeals. Instead, Taylor is attempting to negotiate a better
position than the one he had when he appealed this Court's decision. First, he asks this Court to
insert language that makes the Amended Judgments retroactive to a date long before the current
Judgments were entered and even before this Court entered its Opinions and Orders upon which
the Judgments are based. Second, he seeks to undo the current Judgments awarding attorney fees
and the satisfactions of those Judgments. The attorney fee issues are on appeal and cannot be
undone by a request for a final, appealable judgment, especially when made by the prevailing
parties in order to perfect the losing party's appeals. The Amended Judgments will have
whatever effect they will have and Taylor can make his arguments of their affect to the Supreme
Court.
This Court has jurisdiction to amend the Judgments. The Amended Judgments are
needed to ripen Taylor's appeals. The DefendantsIRespondents' interest in doing so is to have
the merits of the appeals heard at the currently scheduled oral argument (April 9 , 2 0 10) and to
avoid the delay that will be caused if the Amended Judgments are not entered before then.
Taylor's attempt to either cause delay or to leverage a better position for himself through what
should be a simple, ministerial act should not be countenanced and the joint motion should be
granted.

11. ANtlLYSIS
?'lie "legal" groi~ndsargued by 'Taylor to prcvcnt the Amended Jucfgments from being
entered are without merit. Taylor fails to distinguish, analyze, discuss or even mention, let alone
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cite to, the new Supreme Coi~rtcase that created the prcmati~rityof his appeals in the first place
and was the genesis of DefendantsiRespondcnts' quest to cure that prematurity. (kSeeEx. A
attached to 'rhomson Afkidavit in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgment,

Spokane Sirtrct~r~es,
Inc. v. Eqtritcrhle fnvestlnent, LLC, 2009 Opinion No. 6 (January 28, 20 1 O).)
Nor do the conglomeration of the rules and statutes cited by 'Taylor prevent the entry of the
Amended Judgments. DefendantsiRespondents will address each of Taylor's arguments in the
order made.
A.

The Court's Oninions and Orders Were Not Annealable; the Amended J u d ~ m e n t s
Will Be Final and Annealable.

Taylor claims that the Opinions and Orders granting the Motions to Dismiss the
Complaints and denying the Motions to Amend are final, appealable orders. As soon as
DefendantslRespondents learned of the Spokane Structures case they forwarded a copy of that
case to Taylor's counsel, analyzed how the case affected his appeals and requested that he
stipulate to amended judgments. (See Ex. A to Supplemental Thomson Affidavit, emaif dated
February 1, 20 10.) The bases of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, to which
Taylor objects, was Spokane Strtictures. Any reasonable interpretation of Spokune Strzlctures is
that this Court's Orders and Opinions granting the Motions to Dismiss and denying the Motions
to Amend are not final, atmealable orders and that the later filed Judgments are final only as to
attorney fees and not to the substantive issues on appeal. Despite being presented with Spokcrne

Strtlcitves on two separate occasions, 'faylor fails to mention or cite to this case.
Instead, he cites to Goo~ltntrnOil Co. v. Scoffy 's Duro-Bilt Genertrtor, Inc., 20 10 Opinion
No. 15,20 I0 WL 366704 (February 3, 20 10) fbr the proposition that an order granting a motion
to dis~nissand denying a motion to amend are appealrible orders. While the Goodtucin Oil case is
not a lexicon of clarity, it in no manner can be read to make the Orders and Opinions in this case

tinal, appealable orders. First, Cioo~/tncmOil deals with an i ~ n t i m e appeal,
l~
whereas the issue
here is the prematurity of the appeals as is ciiscussed in Spukcine ,Sfr.rrcttlt.r.r, making ,Spok~tr?e
,Sfrzlctrve.s the pertinent case. Second, Goot/mnn Oil does not overrule or undo (and in fact
supports) the Spokcme Stt.trctlrres requirement that a judgment be a separate document from
Orders and Opinions not containing the Court's reasoning and basis for granting the relief upon
which a judgment would be entered. Third, without describing the order upon which appellate
jurisdiction was based, the Goocirncm Oil Court held that it was a separate document and was a
judgment under the definition o f Rule 54(a) and was therefore appealable. Obviously, it did not
contain the district court's reasoning, a defect the Opinions and Orders clearly have. Fourth, no
where in Goodmctn Oil does the Court analyze or even mention orders denying motions to
amend. Under either Spokane Strtlct~tresor Goodman Oil, the Orders and Opinions in this case
do not meet the proper requirements and are therefore not appealable. Under the most recent,
applicable case law rendered by the Idaho Supreme Court, Taylors' appeals are premature.
Based on that same case law the method for curing that prematurity is to enter Amended
Judgments.

B.

The Amended Judpments Do Not Violate the Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.

Rule 59(e) Requiring Amendments to J u d ~ m e n t sAfter Fourteen (1 4) Days
From Entrv Does Not Annly.

First, the DefendantsIRespondents have never taken the position that a judgment was
never entered. As Taylor well knows, Judgments were entered on April 24, 2009, thus the need
for Amended Judgments. DefendantsIRespondents' argument is instead that there was no final,
uppealrtble ji~dgmentas to the substantive issues on appeal and that this Court has j~~risdiction
to
enter the same. (Set. Idaho Appellate Rules 13(b)(4) and 13.)

iiE1'I.Y IN SUI'I'ORT OF IlEFENDr\NTS' JOINT
MO 1'1ON FOR k\h.lENDED JUDGhllENTS - 4

Second, 'Taylor's semantics rtside, if the Court deems it appropriate to call the proposed
documents Judgments rather than Amended Judgments, the Defendants/Rcspondcnts have no
objection. 'There are, howevcr, final, appealable Judgments regarding attorney fees and costs and
another documented "Ji~dgment"could lead to confusion. Regardless, any new Judgments or
Amended Judgments would not effect those awards. Under this new Judgment scenario, Rule
59(e) would not apply.
Third, Rule 59(e) does not apply to these Amended Judgments. To the extent any rule
basis is needed (other than the appellate rules already cited to the Court), a motion to amend the
judgments can be made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) or (6). There is no time limit for bringing a
60(b)(5) or ( 6 ) motion other than it be within a reasonable time. Compron v. G'ompton, 10 1 Idaho
328,6 12 P.2d 1 175 (1 980). See also Low v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259,646 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App.
1982). Bringing a motion within days of a new Supreme Court case is clearly within a
reasonable time. Moreover, while a lawsuit is on appeal a district court has jurisdiction to act in
aid of and not inconsistent with the appeal. Coerrr dillene T ~ i ~ C l v.
u bCogswell, 93 Idaho 324,
46 P.2d 107 (1969). Entering Amended Judgments would certainly aid these appeals by giving
the appellate court jurisdiction. Indeed, Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(4) grants this court the
power to rule upon "any motion to amend the judgment". I.A.R. 13(b)(5). Idaho Appellate Rule
13(b)(13) grants this court jurisdiction to take any action or enter any order required for the
enforcement of any judgment, order or decree. The Idaho Court of Appeals has defined the
power of the district court to correct 3 judgnient so that it accurately reflects the action taken by
the Court. CVc~rtlv. Ltlpinncci, 1 1 1 Idaho 40, 720 P.2d 223 (Ct.App. 1986). Clearly, the
Amended Ji~dg~nents
are an attempt to correct the prior Judgments to acci~ratelyretlect the lionappealable Orders and Opinions of this court.
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Undcr Taylor's theory that Rule S")(e precludes a Motion to Amend the Judgment as
untimely, Rule 13(b)(5) and (13) would be rendered supertluous. Indeed, the logical extension of
Taylor's argument is that there is no cure to solve the lack of jilrisdiction for his appeals.

The Pronosed Amended Judements itre Segurate Documents as Required by
the Rules and the Newest Cuse Law.

2

Taylor argues that the Amended Judgments "contain a recital of pleadings" and therefore
violate of Rule 54(a) and do not meet the requirement of a separate document under Rule 58(a).
Taylor's argument is based on the following language in the proposed Amended Judgments:
"This Court having reviewed the record in this matter, together with motions, memoranda, briefs
and affidavits filed concerning the above referenced motions, . . . it is hereby ORDERED that
Plaintiff's

Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED."
There is no recital of any document in the proposed Amended Judgments. A recital
contemplates a reiteration of the contents of the document rather than a listing of the type of
document. More importantly, Rule 7(a) limits "pleadings" to complaints, answers, replies to a
counterclaim, answers to a crossclaim, and third party complaints and states that no other
pleading shall be allowed. I.R.C.P. Rule 7(a). There are no mentions, let alone recitals, of any
"pleadings" in the language above. Consequently, the original Judgments regarding attorney fees
do not violate Rule 54(a) and the Amended Judgments are in proper form.
The language attacked by Taylor is form language and may not be required. On the other
hand, its presence does not violate the separate document rule or the final judgment rule.
Nevertheless, if it is of concern to the Court, Defendants/Respondents have no objection to
removing it.
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' JOINT
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3.

There is No Basis to Include L a n ~ u a y ein the Amended J u d ~ m e n t sAbout
Their Legal Effects.

Taylor has demanded, as a condition to stipulating to the proposed iltnended Judgments,
and now asks the Court, to insert language that the Judgments and Orders and Opinions do not
bar claims or causes of action which accrued after October 15, 2008. (Supplemental Thomson
Aff., Ex. B, p. 4.)' There are no legal grounds to require language that describe the legal effect of
the Amended Judgments. The Amended Judgments will be effective as of the date they are
entered. Whether these Judgments are still premature, in the proper form or how they may effect
other claims or causes of action, will occur or not occur as a matter of law and will be decided on
appeal. This Court does not need to list each and every effect the Amended Judgments may have
upon entry. Moreover, the dates selected by Taylor (October 15 andlor 23, 2008) predate this
Court's Opinions and Orders (filed December 23, 2008) granting the Motions to Dismiss and
denying the Motion to Amend. Under no circumstances can any Judgment have any effect prior
to the court's decision upon which the Judgment is based.
Finally, Taylor's efforts to negotiate a better deal than this Court granted him by seeking
to predate the Judgments before the Court's decisions is frivolous and acts merely to delay this
litigation and the appeals. No such language should be added to either proposed Amended
Judgment.

4.

The Award of Attorney Fees was Not Premature Under Anv Theory.

Citing to Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and claiming there must be a finnl Judgment before there can
be an award of attorney fees and costs, Taylor claims that the awards were premature because

'Taylor also uses the date "October 23, 2008". DcfendantslRespondents are at a loss as to
the significance of either date.
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there were no tinal judgments. Rule 54(d)(l)(U) allows the trial court to determine who tvas a
prevailing party by considering the tinal judgment "'or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties." 'The very rule used by Taylor does not require a final judgment
before there is an award of attorney fees. Therefore, the award is neither premature nor void.
Other rules are in concurrence. (See 54(d)(I)(F) (execution refers only to a judgment, not a final,
appealable judgment); Rule 58(d) (satisfaction of judgments refers only to judgments, not final,
appealable judgments); Rule 62(a) (execution may issue immediately upon an entry of judgment,
not a final, appealable judgment and in fact discusses interlocutory judgments).) indeed, Rule
54(d)(5) allows a party to submit a Memorandum of Costs "at any time after the verdict of a jury
or a decision of the court." (See Rule 54(d)(5).) It also places a deadline of fourteen (14) days
after entry of judgment, not h a 1 judgment, for filing the Memorandum of Costs. If the
Memorandum of Costs is not filed within that period there is a waiver of the right to costs. Id.
Since there were Judgments (regardless of whether they were final judgments) the Defendants
would have waived their rights to costs and fees if they had not requested them within fourteen
(14) days of that judgment. Taylor's theory of prematurity of attorney fees runs head-on into the
rule's waiver provision.
Nevertheless, Taylor requires as a precondition to a stipulation, a court order that the
Defendants pay back to Taylor the amount he voluntarily paid for the awards of attorney fees. As
will be seen bclow, Taylor is attempting to undo history and to negotiate a better deal than that
which existed when hc appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Regardless, a motion sought to
ripen '17aylor's appeals is not the propcr stage upon which 'faylor should be seeking to undo this
court's award of attorney fees. Those issues are on appeal and inserting language that resolves
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those issues is beyond this Court's jurisdiction. 'I'lrere shoi~ldbe no order or language in the
Amended Judgments requiring a repayment of attorney fees.
5.

'l'he I\mentlcti Jutlr~mcnts1)o Not Effcct the S;ltisfilctions of ,lutlr~mcnt.

Taylor seems to argue that a satisfaction of a judgment must also meet the separate
document requirement of Rule 58(a). It does, but regardless the separate document rule does not
apply to a satisfaction.
More incredibly, Taylor asks this Court, as a condition to entering Amended Judgments,
to undo the Satisfactions of Judgment and enter judgments in favor of Taylor in the amount of
the attorney fee awards. Though he does not say so, this unusual request that he be declared the
prevailing party and that the DefendantsIRespondents pay to him the attorney fee awards made to
them, appears to be based on the argument above - that the awards of attorney fees were
premature. For the same reasons as discussed above, the proposed Amended Judgments or any
separate order should not reverse the Satisfactions of Judgment or the awards of attorney fees.

6.

The Latest Proposed Amended Judgments Do Refer to "Complaints" Rather
Than "Amended Complaints".

Despite curing this problem before Taylor filed his objection to the Joint Motion for
Amended Judgments, he continues to object to the motion on the basis that a prior, proposed
Amended Judgment erroneously referred to "Amended" Complaints. DefendantsIRespondents
sent new proposed Amended Judgments to Taylor deleting that word on February 19,20 10 and
again copied Taylor on the letter to the Court with the encloscd new, proposed Amended
Judgments sent on February 23, 2010. (See Ex. C, Supplemental 'Thomson Aff.) Both dates
predate the date upon which Taylor's objection was filed.

7.

'favior hlisrcprcsents to this Court 'That DefencIantslResnonctents Fi~ilcdto
Address Taylor's Concerns About the Proposed Amended ,Jud?ments Prior
to Filinfr Elis Onnosition.

Defendants/Rcspondents began the process of seeking a stipulated Amended Judgment on
February 1, 2010. (See Ex. A, Supplemental Thomson Aff.) Despite the observation that this
matter needed to be dealt with quickly, 'Taylor did not respond until February 12, 20 10. At that
time he asked three questions, ostensibly to seek information that would assist them in
completing their evaluation. (See Ex. C, S~~pplemental
Thomson Aff.) Defendants/ Respondents
answered each of these questions in the order made, including agreeing to change the wording of
the Amended Judgments to reflect the concerns. Id. Not satisfied with those answers and
because of Taylor's concerns about the effect of these Amended Judgments in "other cases
presently pending" he asked additional "questions". (See Ex. C, Supplemental Thomson Aff.) In
actuality, these were not questions but rather demands to better his position through the Amended
Judgment process by undoing the attorney fee award, seeking to narrow the legal effect of the
Amended Judgments to aid him in other actions and/or claims, and claiming that he would prefer
to have his appeals remanded back to the district court as premature rather than prejudice himself
in other actions. Id
As described above and in the email exchange attached to the Supplemental Affidavit, it
is clear that in fact Defendants/Respondents responded to the questions and concerns expressed.
Just because Taylor did not like the responses should not allow him to misrepresent to this court
that no responses were made. More to the point, Taylor reveals his motivation for ctelaying this
process - he wants to better himself in not only this action but other pending actions. None of
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these tllotives are a well founded basis for ret'using to slipillate to the proposed Amended
Judgments and now to object to their entry.

111. CONCLUSION
The proposed Amended Judgments should be entered, as drafted and submitted to this
Court. Moreover, in order to assure that these Amendcd Judgments are made part of the
appellate record (and thereby ripen Taylor's appeals), it is requested that the entry of these
Amended Judgments be expedited.
DATED this

1

day of March, 2010.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:
ttorn~ys'for Gary D. dabbitt, D. John
d Y ,Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley,
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
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counsel of record for Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and
Wawley Troxell Ennis & Mawley, LLP and having reviewed the contents of the tile in this matter,
make this affidavit based on personal knowledge.
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Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of email correspondence

between Plaintiff's counsel and myself dated February I, 20 10.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of email correspondence

between Plaintiffs counsel and myself dated February 25,2010.

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of email correspondence

between Plaintiffs counsel and myself dated February 19,2010.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of miscellaneous emails

between Plaintiffs counsel and myself.
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Mr. Bissell
A new Idaho Supreme Court decision came down last Thursday. John Janis and Ibelieve that it impacts the status of the
consolidated appeal in this matter. Ihave attached a copy of the Spokane Stmdvresopinion for your reference.
The attached case raises the possibility that Taylor's appeal will be deemed premature and dismissed or remanded for lack
of appellate jurisdiction. Ithink you would agree that disrnissal of the appeal at this late stage will not benefit any party,
especially since the jurisdictional problem appears curable.
Here is our analysis. The Spokanecase requires a separate document setting forth the exact relief granted. I t can be
entitled Judgment or Order. I f one is not filed the appeal is considered premature, even if there is an Opinion and "Order"
expressly dismissing the complaint, as in this case. When Taylor filed his original Notice of Appeal, it was premature
because there was no Judgment as contemplated by Spokane. There were Judgments later filed and you appropriately filed
an amended notice of appeal. According to Spokane, this should have cured the premature nature of the appeal and vest
appellate jurisdiction. But the potential problem under J. Eismann's analysis is that the judgments are only money
judgments for fees and costs and do not refer to the ultimate relief of disrnissal. So under the Spokane analysis, while the
Court may technically have jurisdiction over the attorney fee issues, it could decide, sua sponte per Spokane, that there are
no separate filings expressly dismissing the action and therefore the rest of the appeal is premature. Irealize that this could
lead to absurd results - like affirming attorney fees because there is a prevailing party but failing to address whether the
party actually prevailed - but that is the nature of this technical decision. I n all likelihood the Court would dismiss the entire
appeal to avoid this result.
We may be able to cure this problem by filing an amended judgment expressly setting forth the disrnissal of the complaint
and the denial of the motion to amend the complaint and thereby avoid further delay. We can do this by stipulation, if
Taylor is willing to do so, or by motion to the district court (which maintains jurisdiction to amend a judgment).
Ihave attached a proposed Amended Judgment. Please let me know if the proposed Amended Judgment meets with your
approval no later than Thursday. Please dso let me know if you are willing to stipulate to its entry. Finally, let me know if
you will agree to supplement the appellate record with the Amended Judgment once it is entered. Idon't think any of us
relish the thought of having to stand before the Idaho Supreme Court in light of Spokaneand explain how we believe the
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Ialso don't think any party wants the appeal dismissed for the sole purpose of
returning to the district court to get an amended judgment and then begin again the appellate process. Please let me know
your thoughts by Thursday. Thanks. Jeff
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, P.A.
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure
under applicable law. I f you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you.
Phone: (208) 343-5454
E-Mail to: jat@elarnburke.com

EXHIBIT A

Jeffrey A. ']Thornson - "Taylor v. flawley 'Troxcll and Clernents Hrown
+dW

"Roderick G . Bond" <rbond@cbkla\ivycrs.com>
"'James U.LaRue"' <JDL@elamburke.com>, "'Jeffrey A. Thomson"'
'TO:
<JA-T@clamburke.com>, "'John Janis'" <jjj@hepworthlaw.com>, "'John Janis'"
"'
<johnjanis@aol.com>
Date:
2/25/2010 1:28 PM
Subject: Taylor v. I-fawley Troxell and Clements Brown
CC:
"'Reed 'faylor"' <rjt@lewistondsl.com>, "'Melanie IIayes"' <mhayes@cbklawyers.com>,
"'Mike Bissell"' <mbissell@cbklawyers.com>
From:

Counsel:
It goes without saying that I repeat my previous requests for information and if
your clients are willing to stipulate to judgments and take action that address the
concerns raised in Reed Taylor's Response, I do not see why we couldn't agree
on language and orders that would suit everyone's disclosed needs (of course, I
am not privy to any other reasons you may have for the proposed "Amended
Judgments").
Roderick C . Bond

7 S. Howard Streat, S t e . 416
Spokane, WA 99201
P . 509.455.7100
F . 509.455.7111
WWW.CBKLAWYERS.COM
- This email and any attachments may be attorney-client privileged, protected as attorney work product, and/or subject
to any other applicable privileges. The unauthorized vlewing or dissimination of any cmail or attachment is
prohib~ted.In any event, by reviewing andlor receiving this cmail and any attachments, you irrevocably consent to be
bound b y a claw-back agreement to protect this email and any attached files wherein you agree to not to dissem~nate
any of t h ~ s~nforrn~tlon,
to keep all infannation confidential, and to return all ernall and attachments to the above
sender ~f y o t ~are not an intended recip~ent.

-

Jeffrey A. Thomson RE: Taylor v. HTEH and C 8 N
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
CC:
Aaachments:

Jeffrey A. Thomson
Bond, Roderick
2/19/2010 11:42 AM
RE: Taylor v. HTEH and CBM
Bissell', 'Mike; Janis', 'John
judgment-Amended-McNichols.pdf; judgment-Amended.pdf

Ispoke with Mr. Janis and he agrees and adopts the following on behalf of his clients. What we are seeking by
way of stipulation are final appealable judgments in order to ripen your client's appeals. While the Judgments
currently in place are not appealable, except as to attorney fees, they are Judgments in all other respects,
including as to attorney fees. Iwould again encourage your client to avoid unnecessary expense and delay by
stipulating to the Amended Judgments. Ihave attached new proposed Amended Judgments that remove the
reference to an "amended" complaint and add a further reference to IRCP 58(a) to the first paragraph. Please
let me know your client's willingness to stipulate to entry of the attached Amended Judgments.

Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, P.A.
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from
disclosure under applicable law. I f you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by
replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you.
Phone: (208) 343-5454
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke.com
,

>>> On 2/17/2010 at 12:19 PM, in message c017801cab006$3217e6c0$9647b440$@com~,"Roderick C.
Bond" <rbond@cbklawyers.com> wrote:
Thanks for the email Jeff.

I

We understand your position, although we still have not fully researched the
issue, particularly with the potential ramifications on pending lawsuits.
Thanks also for the clarification on the Amended Complaint. Ihope that you
understand our concerns based upon the other cases presently pending and the
potential ramifications to these cases. Nevertheless, in response, Iwould
pose the following questions/discussion points to you, which are based upon
the assumption that your arguments are correct and with Reed Taylor
reserving all rights and arguments:
1. I f there is no judgment as you assert, then there was no
prevailing party for purposes of attorney's fees and the resulting motions
and judgments. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Obviously, your clients have
asserted that Reed Taylor's payment of the attorneys' fees results in that
he is barred from receiving his money back if he prevails on issues on
appeal. I f we agreed to a stipulated judgment, would you and John's clients
agree then to return the attorney fee payments so as to make that issue
moot? Obviously, we do not believe that paying the judgments in light of
the facts and circumstances moots the issue, but we would want that issue
resolved and we could file a motion to have the whole issue addressed again
and demand repayment of the fees and costs paid by Reed Taylor. What is
your and John's thoughts on this issue?

EXHIBIT C

2. What about the date of the Judgment and its potential
ramification? I t seems to me that we would need language stating that it
does not bar claims which accrued after Reed Taylor filed his Complaints in
that action. What are your and John's thoughts in this regard?
3, My review of Rule 54(a) is that there would be no pleadings or
matters referenced in the judgment. Thus, nothing should be listed in the
Judgment. Also, it would seem to me that the document would only be a
judgment, not an amended judgment. Then, we would either stipulate on the
attorney's fees or re-litigate that issue I guess, again, based upon your
and John's theory. I see why you want the attorneys' fees in your proposed
Amended Judgment to clean up the premature award of attorneys' fees, as that
issue is a real problem as well under your theory. However, based upon our
concerns mentioned above, it would seem to me that we might be able to enter
into a stipulation that accomplishes everything without prejudicing Reed
Taylor or your clients.

4. Based upon the pending Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., appeal,
we frankly would prefer to have the case sent back than to prejudice our
client in some way. I would say that theory on your side (including cases
that your clients are acting as attorneys) has been delay and continues to
be delay. This makes me and Mike both wonder if there is some other motive
on your side for wanting to have Judge Brudie sign a new document. Maybe
you and John could confirm in writing that there is no other motive for
entering your proposed judgments?

Based upon the above, we are contemplating filing our own motion as well as
responding to your and John's client's motion. Do you think that it would
be possible to enter into a stipulation and appropriate judgment that would
alleviate everyone's concerns? Let me know. Thanks.

Roderick C. Bond

7 S. Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 99201
P. 509.455.7100
F. 509.455.7111
WWW.CBKLAWYERS.COM

This email and any attachments may be attorney-client privileged, protected
as attorney work product, and/or subject to any other applicable privileges.
The unauthorized viewing or dissimination of any email or attachment is
prohibited. I n any event, by reviewing and/or receiving this email and any
attachments, you irrevocably consent to be bound by a claw-back agreement to
protect this email and any attached files wherein you agree to not to
disseminate any of this information, to keep all information confidential,
and to return all email and attachments to the above sender if you are not
an intended recipient.

-----Original Message----From: Jeffrey A. Thomson [mailto:JAT@elamburke.com]
Sent: Tuesday, February 16, 2010 10:55 AM

To: Roderick Bond
Cc: 'Mike Bissell'; 'John Janis'
Subject: Re: Taylor v, HTEH and CBM
Mr. Bond
Iwill attempt to answer your questions so that we can move the appeal
forward and avoid the potential for a remand based on a premature
appeal. Mr. Janis may have his own thoughts and, if so, Iencourage him
to respond.
1. You are correct that it is our position there is no final,
appealable judgment. However, that doesn't change the fact that there
was a Judgment entered by the district court on the award of attorney
fees. This Judgment is not a final, appealable Judgment as to the motion
to dismiss and the motion to amend complaint per the Court's recent
rulings. Therefore, and in order to avoid confusion through entry of yet
another Judgment, we are seeking an Amended Judgment.

2. Thank you for catching this error. The proposed Amended Judgments
should indeed refer to the Complaints and not to the Amended Complaints.
We will provide new proposed judgments to reflect this change.

3. While I'm not certain that a complete listing of every affidavit,
motion, brief, etc. needs to be listed to perfect the Judgment, I would
certainly be willing to do my best to add all of those documents if it
will help us to come to a stipulated agreement for entry of an Amended
Judgment and thereby avoid the cost of additional briefing and
attendance at the hearing.
Please let me know if these answers help in your analysis and whether
we can stipulate to entry of the Amended Judgment.
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, P.A.
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential
and privileged information exempt from disclosure under applicable law.
I f you have received this message by mistake, please notify us
immediately by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not
review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you.
Phone: (208) 343-5454
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke.com

>>> "Roderick C. Ebnd" ~rbond@cbklawyers.com~
2/12/2010 11:11 AM >>>
John and Jeff:

Mike and I have reviewed your joint motions and we are still
evaluating
them. However, there is some information we would like to assist us
in
completing our evaluation.

1. Under your theory, there is no final judgment. Why is your
proposed
Judgment entitled "Amended Judgment"? Wouldn't it be just the
Judgment
under your theory since there is either a judgment or not a judgment?
Could you please explain to me why your proposed Judgment
2.
states
"JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in
its
entirety"? Obviously, the First Amended Complaints were never filed
in
either case.
Finally, under your theory, shouldn't the Judgment specify what
3.
affidavits, briefs, etc. were considered for each motion instead of
blanket
language stating that all the affidavits, motions, briefs, etc. were
considered for the Amended Judgment?

I f you could provide answers to the above, it would be appreciated and
helpful to us in evaluating your motion and how to proceed and whether
we
can all agree on a judgment or not, assuming your theory is correct.
Thanks.

Roderick C. Bond

CBK Clear.jpg

7 S. Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 99201
P. 509.455.7100

F. 509.455.7111

< http://WWW.CBKL4WY ERS.COM> www.CBKLAWYERS.COM

This email and any attachments may be attorney-client privileged,
protected
as attorney work product, and/or subject to any other applicable
privileges.
The unauthorized viewing or dissimination of any email or attachment
is
prohibited. I n any event, by reviewing and/or receiving this email and
any
attachments, you irrevocably consent to be bound by a claw-back
agreement to
protect this email and any attached files wherein you agree to not to
disseminate any of this information, to keep all information
confidential,
and to return all email and attachments to the above sender if you are
not
an intended recipient.
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To:
Date:
Subject:
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.ejohnjanis@aol.com>
~JATQelarn
burke.com>, <mbissellQcbklawyers.comr
21112010 5:03 PM
Re: Taylor v. HTEHlMcNichols Appeal

Hi Mike. John Janis here as well following up with this email from Jeff Thompson. He rightly reports we
drew the same conclusions after reviewing this Spokane Structures, ,Inc. case. I'd make the same
proposal Mr. Thompson makes for the McNichols case. If you guys are OK with the proposal I will provide
substantially similar if not identical document as provided by him.
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 West Bannock
Boise, ldaho 83701
office phone (208) 343 7510
fax # (208) 342 2927

-----Original Message----From: Jeffrey A. Thomson cJAT@elamburke.com>
To: 'Mike Bissell' cmbissellQcbklawyers.com>
Cc: John Janis <johnjanis@aol.com>;James D. LaRue <JDL@elamburke.com>;John Janis
<jjj @ hepworthlaw.com>
Sent: Mon, Feb 1, 2010 4:01 pm
Subject: Taylor v. HTEHIMcNicholsAppeal
Mr. Bissell
A new ldaho Supreme Court decision came down last Thursday. John Janis
nd I believe that it impacts the status of the consolidated appeal in
his matter. I have attached a copy of the Spokane Structures opinion
or your reference.
The attached case raises the possibility that Taylor's appeal will be
eemed premature and dismissed or remanded for lack of appellate
urisdiction. I think you would agree that dismissal of the appeal at
his late stage will not benefit any party, especially since the
urisdictional problem appears curable.
Here is our analysis. The Spokane case requires a separate document
etting forth the exact relief granted. It can be entitled Judgment or
rder. If one is not filed the appeal is considered premature, even if
here is an Opinion and "Order" expressly dismissing the complaint, as
n this case. When Taylor filed his original Notice of Appeal, it was
remature because there was no Judgment as contemplated by Spokane.
here were Judgments later filed and you appropriately filed an amended
otice of appeal. According to Spokane, this should have cured the
remature nature of the appeal and vest appellate jurisdiction. But the
otential problem under J. Eismann's analysis is that the judgments are
nly money judgments for fees and costs and do not refer to the ultimate
elief of dismissal. So under the Spokane analysis, while the Court may
ethnically have jurisdiction over the attorney fee issues, it could
ecide, sua sponte per Spokane, that there are no separate filings
xpressly dismissing the action and therefore the rest of the appeal is
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remature. I realize that this could lead to absurd results - like
ftirming attorney fees because there is a prevailing party but failing
o address whether the party actually prevailed - but that is the nature
f this technical decision. In all likelihood the Court would dismiss
he entire appeal to avoid this result.
We may be able to cure this problem by filing an amended judgment
xpressly setting forth the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of
he motion to amend the complaint and thereby avoid further delay. We
an do this by stipulation, if Taylor is willing to do so, or by motion
o the district court (which maintains jurisdiction to amend a
udgment).
I have attached a proposed Amended Judgment. Please let me know if the
roposed Amended Judgment meets with your approval no later than
hursday. Please also let me know if you are willing to stipulate to its
ntry. Finally, let me know if you will agree to supplement the
ppellate record with the Amended Judgment once it is entered. I don't
hink any of us relish the thought of having to stand before the Idaho
upreme Court in light of Spokane and explain how we believe the Court
as jurisdiction to hear the appeal. t also don't think any party wants
he appeal dismissed for the sole purpose of returning to the district
ourt to get an amended judgment and then begin again the appellate
rocess. Please let me know your thoughts by Thursday. Thanks. Jeff
effrey A. Thomson
lam & Burke, P.A.
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential
nd privileged information exempt from disclosure under applicable law.
f you have received this message by mistake, please notify us
mmediately by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not
eview, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you.
hone: (208) 343-5454
-Mail to: jat @elamburke.com
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From:
To:
Date:
Subject:

"Roderick C. Bond" <rbond@cbklawyers.com>
"'Jeffrey A. Thomson"' .~.JATQelamburke.comz,"'Mike Bissell"' <mbissell@c,..
2/5/2010 11:12 AM
RE: Taylor v. HTEHIMcNichols Appeal

CC:
Jeff:

"'John Janis'" cjohnjanisQaol.com>, "'John Janis"' cjjj8hepworthlaw.com~
...

Sorry for the delay getting back to you, but Mike and I have been busy with
other issues and cases. At this time, we cannot agree to anything as we
have not had time to fully evaluate the issues or meet with our client. I
would, note, however, that the language in your proposed complaint would not
be acceptable to us and the effective date of any order would also be an
issue, even if your analysis was correct. That being said, feel free to
file whatever motion you need to file and we will timely respond. By
telling you this, we, of course, are not agreeing that your motion would be
appropriate. Thanks and sorry for the delay getting back to you.
Roderick C. Bond

7 S. Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 99201
P. 509.455.71 00
F. 509.455.71 11

WWW.CBKLAWYERS.COM
This email and any attachments may be attorney-client privileged, protected
as attorney work product, andlor subject to any other applicable privileges.
The unauthorized viewing or dissimination of any email or attachment is
prohibited. In any event, by reviewing and/or receiving this email and any
attachments, you irrevocably consent to be bound by a claw-back agreement to
protect this email and any attached files wherein you agree to not to
disseminate any of this information, to keep all information confidential,
and to return all email and attachments to the above sender if you are not
an intended recipient.
-----Original Message----From: Jeffrey A. Thomson [mailto:JAT@elamburke.com]
Sent: Friday, February 05, 2010 9:37 AM
To: Mike Bissell
Cc: John Janis; Rod Bond; John Janis
Subject: RE: Taylor v. HTEHIMcNichols Appeal
Mr. Bissell
Attached is another recent case on the issue of final judgments and
jurisdiction over appeals. Though the Court claims to try and clarify
matters, this second case is not help terribly helpful. Nevertheless, I
believe the analysis still holds that unless something is done the Taylor
appeal will be considered premature. I did not hear from you regarding a
response to my last e-mail, asking for a response yesterday.
It is my intent to file a motion seeking an amended judgment in the form
sent to you with the first e-mail. I would prefer to do this by stipulation,
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but will proceed with the motion if I do not hear from you.
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, P.A.
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and
privileged information exempt from disclosure under applicable law.
If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately
by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose,
copy, or distribute it. Thank you.
Phone: (208) 343-5454
E-Mail to: jat @elamburke.com
>>> "Mike Bissell" <mbissell@cbklawyers.com> 2/1/2010 5:12 PM >>>
We evaluating it and will get back to you.

Michael S. Bissell

The information contained in this email is protected by the attorney-client
or attorney work product privilege. If you are not the intended recipient
of this email please notify me in a reply email and delete this message.
Thank you.
-----Original Message----From: Jeffrey A. Thomson [mailto:JAT@elamburke.com]
Sent: Monday, February 01, 2010 3:02 PM
To: 'Mike Bissell'
Cc: John Janis; James D. LaRue; John Janis
Subject: Taylor v. HTEHlMcNichols Appeal
Mr. Bissell
A new Idaho Supreme Court decision came down last Thursday. John Janis and I
believe that it impacts the status of the consolidated appeal in this
matter. I have attached a copy of the Spokane Structures opinion for your
reference.
The attached case raises the possibility that Taylor's appeal will be deemed
premature and dismissed or remanded for lack of appellate jurisdiction. I
think you would agree that dismissal of the appeal at this late stage will
not benefit any party, especially since the jurisdictional problem appears
curable.
Here is our analysis. The Spokane case requires a separate document setting
forth the exact relief granted. It can be entitled Judgment or Order. If one
is not filed the appeal is considered premature, even if there is an Opinion
and "Order" expressly dismissing the complaint, as in this case. When Taylor
filed his original Notice of Appeal, it was premature because there was no
Judgment as contemplated by Spokane.
There were Judgments later filed and you appropriately filed an amended

Page

notice of appeal. According to Spokane, this should have cured the premature
nature of the appeal and vest appellate jurisdiction. But the potential
problem under J. Eismann's analysis is that the judgments are only money
judgments for fees and costs and do not refer to the ultimate relief of
dismissal. So under the Spokane analysis, while the Court may technically
have jurisdiction over the attorney fee issues, it could decide, sua sponte
per Spokane, that there are no separate filings expressly dismissing the
action and therefore the rest of the appeal is premature. I realize that
this could lead to absurd results - like affirming attorney fees because
there is a preva~lingparty but failing to address whether the party
actually prevailed - but that is the nature of this technical decision. In
all likelihood the Court would dismiss the entire appeal to avoid this
result.
We may be able to cure this problem by filing an amended judgment expressly
setting forth the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of the motion to
amend the complaint and thereby avoid further delay. We can do this by
stipulation, if Taylor is willing to do so, or by motion to the district
court (which maintains jurisdiction to amend a judgment).
I have attached a proposed Amended Judgment. Please let me know if the
proposed Amended Judgment meets with your approval no later than Thursday.
Please also let me know if you are willing to stipulate to its entry.
Finally, let me know if you will agree to supplement the appellate record
with the Amended Judgment once it is entered. I don't think any of us relish
the thought of having to stand before the Idaho Supreme Court in light of
Spokane and explain how we believe the Court has jurisdiction to hear the
appeal. I also don't think any party wants the appeal dismissed for the sole
purpose of returning to the district court to get an amended judgment and
then begin again the appellate process. Please let me know your thoughts by
Thursday. Thanks. Jeff
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, P.A.
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and
privileged information exempt from disclosure under applicable law.
If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately
by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose,
copy, or distribute it. Thank you.
Phone: (208) 343-5454
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke.com

From:
Date:
Subject:
Attachments:

Jeffrey A. Thomson
Bissell, Mike
2/5/2010 10:37 A N
RE: Taylor v. HTEH/NcNichols Appeal
-0203154147.pdf

CC:

Bond, Rod; Janis, John; Janis, John

To:

Mr. Bissell
Attached Is another recent case on the issue of final judgments and jurisdiction over appeals. Though the Court clalms to
try and clarify matters, this second case is not help terribly helpful. Nevertheless, Ibelieve the analysis still holds that unless
something is done the Taylor appeal will be considered premature. Idid not hear from you regarding a response to my last
e-mail, asking for a response yesterday. I t Is my intent to file a motion seeking an amended judgment in the form sent to
you with the first email. Iwould prefer to do thls by stipulation, but will proceed with the motion if Ido not hear from you.
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, P.A.
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mall message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure
under applicable law. I f you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you.
Phone: (208) 343-5454
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke.com

>>> "Mike Bissell" <mbissellbcbklawvers,com> 2/1/2010 5:12 PM >>>
We evaluating it and will get back to you.
Michael S. Bissell

The information contained in this email is protected by the attorney-client
or attorney work product privilege. I f you are not the intended recipient
of this email please notify me in a reply email and delete this message.
Thank you.
-----Original Message---From: Jeffrey A. Thomson - : J A T b e m
Sent: Monday, February 01, 2010 3:02 PM
To: 'Mike Bissell'
Cc: John Janis; James D. LaRue; John Janls
Subject: Taylor v. HTEH/McNichols Appeal
Mr. Bissell
A new Idaho Supreme Court decision came down last Thursday. John Janis
and Ibelieve that it impacts the status of the consolidated appeal in
this matter. Ihave attached a copy of the Spokane Structures opinion
for your reference.
The attached case raises the possibility that Taylor's appeal will be
deemed premature and dismissed or remanded for lack of appellate
jurisdiction. Ithink you would agree that dismissal of the appeal at
this late stage will not benefit any party, especially since the
jurisdictional problem appears curable.
Here is our analysis. The Spokane case requires a separate document
setting forth the exact relief granted. I t can be entitled Judgment or

Order. I f one 15 not filed the appeal is considered premature, even if
there is an Opinion and "Orderwexpressly dismisslng the complaint, as
in this case. When Taylor filed his original Notice of Appeal, it was
premature because there was no Judgment as contemplated by Spokane.
There were Judgments later filed and you appropriately filed an amended
notice of appeal. According to Spokane, thls should have cured the
premature nature of the appeal and vest appellate jurisdktion. But the
potential problem under J. Eismann's analysis is that the judgments are
only money judgments for fees and costs and do not refer to the ultlmate
rellef of dismissal. So under the Spokane analysis, whlk the Court may
technically have jurisdiction over the attorney fee Issues, it could
decide, sua sponte per Spokane, that there are no separate Rlings
expressly dismisslng the action and therefore the rest of the appeal is
premature. Ireallze that this could lead to absurd results - like
affirming attorney fees -use
there is a prwalling party but failing
to address whether the party actually prevailed - but that Is the nature
of this technical decision. I n all Ilkellhood the Court would dlsmiss
the entire appeal to avoid this result.
We may be able to cure thls problem by Rling an amended judgment
expressly setting forth the dlsmlssal of the complalnt and the denial of
the motlon to amend the complalnt and thereby avoid further delay. We
can do thls by stipulation, tf Taylor Is willlng ta do so, or by motion
to the district court (which maintains jurisdktion to amend a
judgment).
Ihave attached a proposed Amended Judgment. Please k t me know if the
proposed Amended Judgment meets with your approval no later than
Thursday. Please also let me know if you are willing ta stipulate ta its
entry. Finally, let me know if you will agree to supplement the
appellate record with the Amended Judgment once it Is entered. Idon't
think any of us rellsh the thought of havlng to stand before the Idaho
Supreme Court in light of Spokane and explaln how we believe the Court
has jurisdtctlon to hear the appeal. Ialso don't thlnk any party wants
the appeal dkmlssed for the sole purpose of retumlng ta the district
court to get an amended judgment and then begin again the appellate
process. Pkase let me know your thoughts by Thursday. Thanks. Jeff

Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, P.A.
ConRdentiality Notke: This e-mail message may contaln confldential
and privileged information exempt from dixlosure under applicable law.
I f you have recehred this message by mlstake, please notify us
immedlately by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not
review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you.
Phone: (208) 343-5454
E-Mail to:

,

~

[ (2/5/2010)Jeffrey A. ~ h o m s o n- RE: f-

Page

affirming aflorney fees because there is a prevailing party but failing
to address whether the party actually prevailed - but that is the nature
of this technical decision. In all likelihood the Court would dismiss
the entire appeal to avoid this result.

immediately by replying to this
review, disclose, copy, or distr
Phone: (208) 343-5454
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MC NICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER
Supreme Court Docket Nos. 36130-2009
(3613 1-2009)
Nez Perce County Docket Nos. 2008-1763
(2008-1765)

1
1

A S E T H MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with attachments was filed by
Respondents on March 26, 2010. Further, a MOTION TO AUGMENT AUTHORITY AND

Ill
Ill
161

ARGUMENT BY ACCEPTING THE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF and a THIRD
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD were filed by Appellant Reed Taylor on April 1, 2010. A
JOINT RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S THIRD MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD and
RESPONDENTS'

JOINT RESPONSE

TO APPELLANT'S

MOTION TO AUGMENT

AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT were filed by Respondents April 2, 2010.

Therefore, good

cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the appeal record shall include the documents listed
below, file stamped copies of whch accompanied the Motions:
1. Partial Opposition to Taylor's Request for Judicial Notice Re: Defendants' Joint
Motion for Amended Judgment in No. CV08-01763 and CV08-01765 as filed in
District Court March 17, 201 0.

/I/

I//! I

i lI
I

/I I

I
I

2. Judgment in Case No. CV08-01763 as filed in District Court March 18,2010.

3. Judgment in Case No. CV08-01765 as filed in District Court March 18,2010.
4. Amended Judgment in Case No. CV08-01763 as filed in District Court March 22,
2010. -

Il

/1 1I

5. Amended Judgment in Case No. CV08-01765 as filed in District Court March 22,

6. Reed Taylor's Response to Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments as
filed in Case Nos. CV2008-1763 and CV2008-1765 (attached as Exhibits A and B).
0RDF.R - T 2 n c , k p , t 1 ? 1 - 3 0 0
ill

I

7. Third Amended Notice of Appeal as filed in Case No. CV08-01763 (attached as
I

I

j

8. Tbrrd Amended Notice of Appeal as filed in Case No. CV08-01765 attached as
Exhibit D).

j
f
t

IT FURTHER IS ORDEFED that the MOTION TO AUGMENT AUTHORITY

It1
I

'i

AND m C ; m E N T BY ACCEPTING TEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF filed by

I
#f

f

II

Mpellant Reed Taylor April 1,2010 be, and hereby is, DENIED as any additional ar,~umentscan
be addressed during oral argument
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I
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For the Supreme Court
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Plaintiff-Appellant, Reed J, Taylor, by and though his attorneys, Michael S. Bissell and
Roderick C. Band of Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, submits this Response to Defendants'
Joint Motion for h e a d e d Judgment:

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite requests from the undersigned counsel, the defendants' counsel will not explain

why "Amended Judgments" are required in the form and manner submitted, except to "ripen" the
appeal. Of course, when clear questions are not answered by the defendants' counsel, it becomes
obvious why Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to their proposed "Amended Judgments."
Curiously, the defendants argue on one hand that there are no final judgments. Yet, on the other
hand, the defendants submitted proposed "Amended Judgments" for the court to sign and
included other substantial language that is not in accord with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

11. LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. The "Amended Judgments" are not required as the court's orders were
appealable orders.

An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and denying a motion to amend are an appealable orders. See Goodman
Oil Company v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 2010 WL 366704 *3-4 (Idaho 2010);
I.R.C.P. 54(a); I.R.C.P. %(a); I.A.R. 1I(a)(l).
On December 23, 2008, the court entered its opinion and orders granting the defendants'
Motions to Dismiss and denying Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. Although Reed Taylor
contends that the court did not address a number of his arguments and claims, the opinions and
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orders were appealable orders, and Reed Taylor timely appealed those orders.

2. Even if the defendants are correct, no judgments may be amended after 14
days from entry.
A motion to alter or m e n d a judgment must be brought within 14 days of the date of any
judgment. I.R.C.P. 59(e).
Defendants content ,that there are no final judgments and curiously submit, without
explanation, proposed "Amended Judgments." If, as the defendants contend, a formal judgment
is necessary and that a judgment was never entered, then there would be no "Amended
Judgments" as there were never any judgments to begin with. As for incIudiag the attorneys'
fees and costs judgments within their "Proposed Amended Judgments," the time has long passed
to amend those judgments, assuming they are not void under the defendants' arguments.

Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, then only a judgment may be entered, not
an amended judgment and not addressing issues of fees and costs or the satisfaction of any
judgments, particularly when those judgments would be void under the defendants' rationale.
2. Even if the defendants are correct, the judgments must be a separate
document.

"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document."I.R.C.P.
judgment shaIl not contain a recitaI of pleadings.

58(a).

"A

. ." I.R.C.P. 54(a).

Thus, it would be wholly inappropriate to include any language regarding the pleadings,
affidavits or other information considered, particularly when certain pleadings and affidavits
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referenced in the proposed " h e n d e d Judgments'bere never submined or relied upon the court
to render its decision on the Motions to Dismiss and Mations to Amend.
Thus, if the defendanls' argments are correct, any judgment should be a separate
docment, should not recite pleadings, should confom to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
and should not be based upon the language in the proposed Amended Judgments.

3. Even if the defendants are correct, language should be included in the
Judgment stating that they do not include cIaims or causes of action which
accrued after October 15,2008.
Reed Taylor filed his Motions to Amend and Supplement Complaints on October 15,

2008. If the court enters any new, revised or amended judgments or orders, then the court should
insert language in the judgments or orders stating that they do not bar claims or causes of action
which accrued after October 15,2008.

4. Even if the defendants are correct and the court enters anew, revised or
amended judgments, the award of attorneys' fees was premature as there
was no final judgment under the defendants' theory.
If the defendants' theory is correct, then the award of any attorneys' fees and costs would
have been premature as there was no find judgment. 1.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Without a final
judgment, there can be no prevailing party under Rule 54 and it follows that the judgments
entered awarding attorneys' fees and costs are void. I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4).
Therefore, Reed Taylor requests that the court order the defendants to pay the $20,058
previously tendered to them by Reed Taylor to avoid execution into the clerk of the court
pursuant to I.C. $ 10-1 1 1 5. If so ordered, Reed Taylor would stipulate that a new judgment
could be entered on the award of attorneys' fees and costs so long as the judgment is worded
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identical to the prior judgments and is based upon the identical reasons without the necessiq of
requiring the court to hold new hearings on the issue of fees and costs. If the defendants refuse
to pay the $20,058 (a total of $40,116) the court clerk, then Reed Taylor requests that the court
order the defendants to enter judgment in favor of Reed Taylor for the $40,116 owed to him
5. If the defendants are correct, then a satisfaction of judgment cannot be
entered by the court and must be a separate document.
A satisfaction of a judgment may only be entered by a party, the party's attorney or the
court clerk. I.R.C.P. 58(b); I.G. $ 10-1 115. A judgment must be on a separate document.
I.R.C.P. %(a).
Thus, even if the defendants' arguments are correct, a satisfaction of judgment may not
be entered by the court and should not be included in any judgment or order. Rather, any
satisfaction of judgment should only be entered by the in accordance with I.C.

5 10-1115.

However, if the defendants do not agree to promptly pay the $20,058 to the court clerk, then no
satisfaction of judgment should be entered by the court clerk and the court should enter a
judgment in favor of Reed Taylor in the arnount of $20,058 for each action.

6. If the defendants are correct, the language in the judgments should stated
that his "Complaints" were dismissed and not his "Amended Complaints" as
asserted in the proposed Amended Judgments.
In their proposed "Amended Judgments," the defendants asserted language stating that
"JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING PlaintifPs Amended Complaint in its entirety."
See Proposed Amended Judgments, p. 2 (underlined emphasis added).

If the defendants'

arguments are correct, then the judgments or orders entered by the court should only reference

I
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1

"Complaints'bnd not ""Amended Complaints" as Reed Taylor's Amended Complaints were
never filed."

7. The defendants fail to address the above issues and fail to submit any
explanation why their proposed "Amended Judgments" are titled as such
and contains other questioaable andlor inappropriate language.
The defendws never answered questions severai issues and questions posed by Reed
Taylor's counsel in their Joint Motions or otherwise.
"Amended Judgments" instead of "Judgments"?
attorneys' fees judgments in the '"ended

Why are the defendants proposing

Why are the defendants including the

Judgments"?

Why are the defendants including

satisfaction of judgments in the "Amended Judgments"? Why have the defendants' worded their
proposed Amended Judgments in the manner worded in light of the arguments asserted above
and the Rules of Civil Procedure addressed above?

Why did the defendants not limit the

language in their proposed "Amended Judgments" to only claims and causes of action which had
accrued through October 23,2008?
It is not surprising that Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to the proposed
"Amended Judgments" in Iight of the issues presented above and above unanswered questions.
DATED this 25thday February, 2010.

By:

I

RODERICK b. BOND
MICHAEL ,$BISSELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

' Counsel for the defendants have acknowledged that "Amended" Complaints should not be included in
their proposed "Amended Judgments." However, this argument is being asserted to preserve the objection.
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CERTIFICATE OF' SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25Ihday of February, 2010,I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregomg, postage prepaid (if applicable), to the following parties:
WAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION
EIvlAIL (.pdf anachment)

John J. Janis
Hepwort.b, Janis & Brody, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVEWIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION
EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

James D. LaRue
JeErey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704
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RODERICK C. BONLI, LSB No, 8082
f\4IGHAEL, S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5962,
CAMPBEI,L, DISSELL 8;: KIRBY PLLC
4 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 4-55-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7 1 11
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Reed J. Taylor

I

IN THE OlSTRTCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIC'I OF TFIE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J, TAYLOR, an individual,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)

Nez Perce 6ounty Docket Nos.:
CV 2008- 1763 and CV 2008- 1765

i

1
MICI-IAEI, E. NcNIGHOLS, an )
individual; CLEMENTS, BROWN & )
McNICNOLS,
P.A.,
an
Idaho 1
professional corporation; JANE DOES 1
1
I-V, ~~nknown
individuals,
)

Defendants-Respondents,
REED J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D.
JOEN ASHBY, an individual;
PATRICIC V. COLLINS, am individual;
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS &
I-IAWLEY, LI,P, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)

REED TAYLOR'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR
AMENDED JUDGMENTS

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1

Exhibit - B
m<SI'ONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MO'I'ION FOR AMENDED JIJDCmf;I3JTS- 1

Plaintiff-Appellant, Reed J. Taylor, by and though his attorneys, Michael S. Bissell and
Roderick C. Bond of Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLEC, subnrlits this Response to Defendmts"
Joint Motion for 'orended Judgment:

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite requests from the undersigned counsel, the defendants' counsel will not explain
why "Amended Judgments" are required in the form and manner submitted, except to "ripen" the
appeal. Of course, when clear questions are not answered by the defendants' counsel, it becomes
obvious why Reed Taylor would not agree ta stipulate to their proposed "Amended Judgments."
Curiously, the defendants argue on one hand that there are no final judgments. Yet, on the other
hand, the defendants submitted proposed "Amended Judgments" for the court to sign and
included other substantial language that is not in accord with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

11. LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. The "Amended Judments" are not required as the court's orders were
appealable orders.

An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and denying a motion to amend are an appealable orders. See Goodman
Oil Company v. Scotty 's Duro-Bilt Generator, h c . , 2010 WL 366704 *3-4 (Idaho 2010);
I.R.C.P. 54(a); I.R.C.P. 58(a); I.A.R. 1 l(a)(l).
On December 23, 2008, the court entered its opinion and orders granting the defendants'
Motions to Dismiss and denying Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. Although Reed Taylor
contends that the court did not address a number of his arguments and claims, the opinions and
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orders were appealable orders, and Reed Taylor timely appealed those orders.

B, Assuming Defendants"" artl;umeuts are correct, their proposed "Amended
1. Even if the defendants are correct, no judgments may be amended after 14
days from entry.
A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be brought within 14 days of the date of any
judgment. I.R.C.P. 59(e).
Defendants content that there are no final judgments and curiously submit, without
explanation, proposed "'Amended Judgments." If, as the defendants contend, a formal judgment
is necessary and that a judgment was never entered, then there would be no "Amended
Judgments" as there were never any judgments to begin with. AS for including the attorneys'
fees and costs judgments within their "Proposed Amended Judgments," the time has long passed
to amend those judgments, assuming they are not void under the defendants' arguments.
Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, then only a judgment may be entered, not
an amended judgment and not addressing issues of fees and costs or the satisfaction of any
judgments, particularly when those judgments would be void under the defendants' rationale.

2. Even if the defendants are correct, the judgments must be a separate
document.
"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document."

I.R.C.P. %(a).

"A

judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings. . ." I.R.C.P. 54(a).
Thus, it would be wholly inappropriate to include any language regarding the pleadings,
affidavits or other information considered, particularly when certain pleadings and affidavits
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referenced in the proposed "Amended Judgments" were never submitted or relied upon the court
to render its decision on the Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Amend.
Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, any judgment should be a separate
docment, should not recite pleadings, should conform to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
and should not be based upon the language in the proposed Amended Judgments.

3. Even if the defendants are correct, language should be included in the
Judgment stating that they do not include claims or causes of action which
accrued after October 15,2008.
Reed Taylor filed his Motions to Amend and Supplement Complaints on October 15,
2008. If the court enters any new, revised or amended judgments or orders, then the court should
insert language in the judgments or orders stating that they do not bar claims or causes of action
which accrued after October 15,2008.

4. Even if the defendants are correct and the court enters new, revised or
amended judgments, the award of attorneys' fees was premature as there
was no final judgment under the defendantsf theory.
If the defendants' theory is correct, then the award of any attorneys' fees and costs would
have been premature as there was no final judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Without a final
judgment, there can be no prevailing party under Rule 54 and it follows that the judgments
entered awarding attorneys' fees and costs are void. I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4).
Therefore, Reed Taylor requests that the court order the defendants to pay the $20,058

I

previously tendered to them by Reed Taylor to avoid execution into the clerk of the court
pursuant to I.C.

9

I

10-1115. If so ordered, Reed Taylor would stipulate that a new judgment

could be entered on the award of attorneys' fees and costs so long as the judgment is worded
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identical to the prior judgments and is based upon the identical reasons without the necessity of
requiring the court to hold new hearings on the issue of fees and costs. If the defendants rehse
to pay the $20,058 (a total of $40,116) the court clerk, then Reed Taylor requests that the court
order the defendants to enter judment in favor of Reed Taylor for the $40,116 owed to him.

5. If the defendants are correct, then a satisfaction of judgment cannot be
entered by the court and must be a separate document.

A satisfaction of a judgment may only be entered by a party, the party's attorney or the
court clerk. I.R.C.P. 58(b); I.C.

5

10-1115. A judgment must be on a separate document.

I.R.C.P. %(a).
Thus, even if the defendantsbrguments are correct, a satisfaction of judgment may not
be entered by the court and should not be included in any judgment or order. Rather, any
satisfaction of judgment should only be entered by the in accordance with I.C. Ej 10-1115.
However, if the defendants do not agree to promptly pay the $20,058 to the court clerk, then no
satisfaction of judgment should be entered by the court clerk and the court should enter a
judgment in favor of Reed Taylor in the amount of $20,058 for each action.

6. If the defendants are correct, the language in the judgments should stated
that his "Complaints" were dismissed and not his "Amended Complaints" as
asserted in the proposed Amended Judgments.
In their proposed "Amended Judgments," the defendants asserted language stating that
"JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in its entirety."
See Proposed Amended Judgments, p. 2 (underlined emphasis added).

If the defendants'

arguments are correct, then the judgments or orders entered by the court should only reference
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"Complaints" and not "'Amended Complaints" as Reed Taylor's Amended Complaints were
never filed."
7. The defendants fail to address the above issues and fail to submit any
explanation why their proposed "Amended Judpents" are titled as such
and contains other questionable andlor inappropriate language.
The defendants never answered questions several issues and questions posed by Reed
Taylor's counsel in their Joint Motions or otherwise.
"Amended Judgments" instead of "Judgments"?

Why are the defendants proposing

Why are the defendants including the

attorneys' fees judgments in the "Amended Judgments"?

Why are the defendants including

satisfaction of judgments in the "Amended Judgments"? Why have the defendants' worded their
proposed Amended Judgments in the manner worded in light of the arguments asserted above
and the Rules of Civil Procedure addressed above?

Why did the defendants not limit the

language in their proposed "Amended Judgments" to only claims and causes of action which had
accrued through October 23,2008?
It is not surprising that Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to the proposed
"Amended Judgments" in light of the issues presented above and above unanswered questions.
DATED this 25thday February, 2010.

MICHAEL S. BISSELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

'

Counsel for the defendants have acknowledged that "Amendedy' Complaints should not be included in
their proposed "Amended Judgments." However, this argument is being asserted to preserve the objection.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Zthday of Febnrary, 2010,I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid (if applicable), to the following parties:

.

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
0VEWIGF.ET MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION
EMAIL (.pdf altachment)

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Brody, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

I IAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL

James D. LaRue
Jeffrey A. Thomson
E l m & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704

7FAX TRANSMISSION
EMAIL AIL (.pdf attachment)
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entered in the above entitled action an the 23'* day of December, 2008, Opiltion and
Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs entered in the
tabol/e ciiii~lcilwctinn Qn Apn1 3, 3009, J~tdgn-tententered on April 24, 2009 (and
subsequent Arncnded Judgment),

Opir~ionand Order on Defendants' Defei~dants"

Motion for Award of Artonley Fees and Costs entered an June 1, 2009, [sic] [Opinion

and Order on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideratio11 and Plaintifl's

Motion for

Reconsideratioil entesed on June I , 20091, Satisfaction of Judglnent entered on
Se&~~bcr 3. 20119, Judgincr~tentered on March 18, 2010, Amendcd .Iuct~mcnten~ereiji111
March 22,201 0, the I-fonorable Jeff M. Brudie presiding.
2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Couit, and t1xe

Judginents/Orders described in pafagraph I above are appealable Orders under and
pursuant to Rules 4 and I f (a)(l), I.A.R.

3.

A preliminaiy statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends

to assert in this appeal are as fbllows (several of which are issues of first impression);
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect
otlzers:
a, Did plaintiff' state causes of action against attorneys for fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation,
and/or tortious interference andlor causes of actions pertaining to
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the
conzrnission of' any of any of the fbregoing causes of action.
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breacbes of
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive coilipensation, and tog-tious
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the comrnissior~of
any of the foregoing causes of action?
c. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for
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con~!er.sionand other causes of action by alleging that the attorney
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the
attolney knew or sl-tould have kflown were funds in whicl-r the
plainiiff'held a valid and perfected security interest?
d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the
revenues and all of the stock of the coporation, have standing to
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for claims owned by
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
desivatlve causes of action on behalf of' the corporation?
e

Does a creditor of' an insolvent corporation, who is also a secured
creditor of the revenues of tlie coiyoration, have standing to assert
direct causes of action against parties for claims owled by the
colporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the co~poration"

f. Are allegations that an attorney has exceeded hisiher scope of
representation siifficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege?
g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients wit11 diverging interests
when the representation was approved by persons with

director/officer conflicts of interest?
h. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bar a person f X o n asserting
direct and derivative claims against an attorney, when the plaintiff
does not have privity of contract with the attorney, for violations of
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act?
i.

In considering a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6j, is it
permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an
entirely different case in toto and/or to consider documents which
are not in the record for that case?

j.

Can a stock pledgee of a11 of the stock and revenues of a pledged
corporation assert direct andlor derivative causes of actions for
malpractice against an attorney?

k. Can a secttred creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of

an insolvent corporation, assert direct and/or derivative claims for
malpractice against an attorney?
1.

Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related
actions, consider privileged documents in granting a motion to
disnliss under IRCP lZ(bj(6) without requiring production of the
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doculi~entsto the other party?

n ~ If
, a party provides privileged documents to an expest and the
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the
privileged documents h r the experts testimouy, has the attorneyclient privilege been waived and must the documents be produced
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel?
n. If Idaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defensc for an attorney, can
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to I.K.G.P.
12(b)(b) for actions talcen by the attorney which the attorney
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from
the cotporation client, when the attorney knows or should have
know11 that: (1) the representatives of the corporation have
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the co~porationhas not held an
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of
representation was not in the best interests of at least two
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of
representatioi~was not in the best iilterests of cach of the attorney's
three different clients.
o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary dut~es,special
duties, and/or third-party beileficiary obligations when the attorney
knows or s h o ~ ~ have
l d known (including, without limitation): (1)
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the
non-client and another client is in default of the obligations which
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the nonclient has voted the shares appointing hirt~selfas the sole officer
and director of the corporation client, and the corporation client is
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties
and not safeguading assets; (3) the assets and funds are
insufficient to pay the secured creditor urho voted the shares of the
corporation pledged to him as collateral; (4) that inillions of dollars
in assets and funds have been unlawfully transfened &om the
corporation client by the very individuals directing the litigation;
and (5) the parent corporation of the pledged corporation is also
being represented by the altoiney and the same non-client is owed
millions of dollars by the parent corporation client who is highly
insolvent?

p. Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the
United States Constitution or the State of Idaho's Constitution) to
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes
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of action to protect and/or recover assets which are subject to a
security interest and/or pursue causes of actions action attorneys
relating to any one or more the hregoing?

q. Did the district court err in awarding attorneys' fees and costs to
Defendants pursuant to I.C. fj 12-121, I.C. S; 30-1-746 and I.C. 5
48-603(5), when plaintiffs claims under each of the foregoing
statutes involved navel claims andor issues of first impression,
and plaintiff asserted claims relating to security interests held by
him for property received by Defendants?
r.

Can a district court award a defendant attorneys' fees pursuant to
I.C. l j 30-1-746 when it found that the plaintiff was not entitled to
bring derivatiire actions as a stock pledgee and secured creditor of
an insolvent colporation under I.C. $ 30-1-746, which does not
expressly prohibit a stock pledgee or secured creditor of an
insolvent corporation from pmsui~lgderivative claims?

s.

Can a district court award attanleys' fees to a defendant pursuant

to I.C. 5 12- 121 after plaintiffs complaint was dismissed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) based in part upon the district court adopting the
"Litigation Privilege" as a first impressian defense?
t.

Can a district court find that a plaintiff pursued an action
frivolously when the plaintiff is a secured creditor who pursues
claims against attorneys who have received p a p t e n t for services
fsom fi~ndssubject to valid and perfected security interests and/or
the proceeds of such valid and perfected security intcrests?

1

Can a district court make findings of facts that attorney defendants
did not violate any rules of professional conduct in an action
dismissed pwsuant to Rule 12(b)(6) wlzen the facts alleged in
plaintiffs complaint state that the attorneys violated rules of
professional conduct?

v. Does the payment of an attorneys' fees and costs iudament that

was paid d~irinsthe pendency of an appeal render the issue of
whether the attorneys' fees were improperly granted moot when
%judgment debtor paid the itldaments out of fear of execution?
w Since it was determined after the entry of an order i~rantinaa
request for attorileys' fees and the correspondinrr iudgment that
there was no final judgment entered, did the district court err bv
not c'acntin~the order a ~ i diuilciment re: nttop1e1.s' fecs 3 1 1 1 ~lherc
~
was no prevailing party in an action at the time the order and
judfiment were entered?
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4.

'There has not been an Order sealing all or any pofiion of this record.

5.

A reporter's tra~lscriptis not reqtrested.

6.

Appellant requests the following documents be incl~kdeciin the clerk's

record, in addition to those automatieaiiy included imder Rule 28,I.A.R.:
a. T h i s Second Amel~dedNotice of Appeal;
b. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal:

c. Plaintiffs Amended Notice of Appeal;

d. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss;
e. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss;

f. Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss;
g. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Supplemeilt Complaint (including
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint);
h. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to
Anzend Complaint;

i. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint;
j.

Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and costs;

k. Defendants' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs;

I.

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of
Fees and Costs;

m. PIaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs;
11. Affridavit of Michael S. Bissell in S~lpportof Plaintif'f Reed J.
Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Attorney's
Fees and Costs;
o. Defendants' Motion to Amend Request for Awad of Attorney's
Fees;
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p, Defendants' Memorandum in Support o f I\/fotion to Arnend
Request f a . Award of Altomey's Fees;
q

PlaintifPs Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs h4otian to
Disallow Fees and Costs.

r. Defendants' Joinder in Brief Filed by Haurlep 7'roxelJ Defenctants
in Response to Reed Taylor's Motion to Disallow Request for
Attorney's Fees and Costs;
s. Opinion and Order on Defetndmts' Motion for Award of Attorney
Fees and Costs;
t.

Judgment;

u. plaint if?^ Motion for Reconsideration of the Opinion, Order and
Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees to Defendants (including the
corrected version filed on May 29, 2009, at the request of the
Court);
v. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for

Reconsideration of the Opinion and Order Awarding Attorney's
Fees to Defendants;
w. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for

Reconsideration;
x. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney

Fees and Costs [sic] Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration and Plaintif'fs Motion for Reconsideration; and

y. Amended Judgment (if' any, as the Court indicated that an
Amended Jtidgment would be filed).
7.

1 certify that:

a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a repos-tes
because a transcript has not been requested.
b. The clerk of the district coilrt has not been paid any fee for
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested.
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been

paid.
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid
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e. Service has been made upon a11 parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20,

DATED this 25" day of March, 201 0.

CAMPBELL, BISSELL 62 KIRBY PLLC

Michael S. Bissell
AMorneys for Appellant Reed J. Taylor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25'h day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of Appellant's Third Amended Notice of Appeal to the following:
--

-- HAND DELIVERY

U.S.MAIL
--OVEEWIGHT MAIL
FAX TMNSMISSION
EMAIL (.pdf aitachent)
- T
)(

2-

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Brody, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
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Exhibit - D

NOTICE IS HEWBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The abo~renamed Appellant Reed J. Taylor appeals against the above-

named Respoildents to tlte Idaho Supreme Court from the final Ordrr granting
Defendants%otion

lo Dismiss and denying Plaintias Motion to Amend Complaint

entered in the above entitled action on the ~ 3 day
' ~of December, 2008, Opinion and
Order on Defendar~ts'Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs entered in the
above entitled action on April 3, 2009, Judgment entered on April 23, 2009, &Opinion
and Order on Deferrdallts' R4otion for Reconsideration and PlailltifPs Motion for
Reconsideration entered on June l , 2009, Satisfaction of Judarnent entered on August 26,
20 1 0, d~tctp~netit
entcrccl o n ? / f a ~ l ~ X
30:1 (1, Amended Judpr~~cilt
e~rtcredon. March 22.

20 10,the Hotlorable Jeff M. Rrudie presiding.

2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgrnents/Orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and
pursuant to Rtiles 4 and 1 1(a)( 1), I.A.R.

3.

A prelirnillary statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends

to assert in this appeal are as follows (several of wltich are issues of first impression);
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect
others:

a. Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fiaud,
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation,
and/or tortious interference and/or causes of actions pertaining to
aiding and abetting and/or co~lspiracy to assist others in the
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of action.
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of'
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, and tortious
interference andlor causes of action pertaining to aiding ar~d
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abetting andlor conspiracy to amst others in the conlnlission of
any of the foregoing causes of aetiol~?
c. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for
canvcrsion atzd other causes of action by alleging that the atforney
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from h n d s the
attorney knew or should have known twre funds in which the
plaintiff held a valid and perfected security interest?

d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secrired creditor of the
revenues and all of the stoclc of the corporation, have standing to
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for clailns owned by
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation?
e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corparation, who is also a secured
creditor of the revenues of the corporation, have standing to assert
direct causes of action against parties for claims owned by the
colporation'? Daes the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the colporation?
f. Are allegations that an attolney has exceeded hisher scope of
representation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege?
g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients ctrith diverging interests

when the representation was approved by persons
directorlofficer conflicts of interest?

with

h. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bw a person from asserting
direct and derivative claiins against an attolney, when the plaintiff
does not have pieivityof contract with the attorney, for violations of
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act?

i. In considering a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is it
pern~issiblefor the district court to take judicial notice of an
entirely different case in tolo andlor to colisider documents which
are not in the record for that case?
j.

Call a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged
corporation assert direct andor derivative causes of actions for
n-talpl.actice against an attorney?

k. Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of

an insolvent corporation, assert disect andlor derivative claims for
malpractice against an attorney?
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I. Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related
actions, consider privileged documents in gl.anting a motion to
dismiss under ERCP 12(b)(6) without requiring prodt~t:tion of the
docunlenrs to the other party?
t ~ t If

a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the
privileged documents for the experts testirnony, has the attorneyclient privilege been waived artd must the doc~lmentsbe produced
to the apposing party upon a motion to compel?

n. If Idaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defense for an attorney, can
the defense be asserted to dismiss an ncrion pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from
the corporation client, when the aeorney knows or should have
known that: (1) the representatives of the corporation have
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation
client have collflicts of interest; (3) the corporation has not held an
annual shareholder meetii~gin years; (4) the purported scope of
representation was not in the best interests of at least two
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of
representation was not in the best interests of each of tile attorney's
three different clients.
o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary duties, special
duties, a~.~d/or
third-party beneficiary obligations when the attorney
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): (I)
that ail of the shares and revenues of the coryoratiolr client the
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the
non-client and another client is in default of the obligations which
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the nonclient has voted the shares appointing himself as the sole officer
and director of the corporation client, and tile corporation cliellt is
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and fi~nds are
insufficient to pay the secured creditor who voted the sEtares of the
c;orporation pledged to him as collateral; (4) that ~nilIionsof dollars
in assets and funds have been unlaailly transferred from the
corporation client by the very individuals directing the litigation;
and (5) the parent cotporation of the pledged corporation is also
being represented by the attonley and the same non-client is owed
nlillions of dollars by the parent corporation client who is highly
insolvent?
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p. Does a pla~ntiffhave a constitutio~~afright (whether tinder the
United States Corlstitution or the State of Jdaho's Conr;litiition) to
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action andlor prusue causes
of action to protect and/or recover assets which are subject to cl
security interest and/or pursue causes of actlons action against
attorneys relating to any one or more the foregoing?
q. Did the district court err in awarding attorneys' I'ees to Defe~ldants,
pursuant to I.C. 5 12-121, I.C. fj 30-1-746 and I.C. $ 48-608(5),
when plaintiffs claims under each of the foregoing statutes
involved novel claims and/or issues of first impression, and
plaintiff asserted claims relating to security interests held by him
for property received by Defendants?

r. Can a district court award a defendant attorneys' fees pursuant to
I.C. 5 30- 1-746 when it fou~tdthat the plaintif-i' was not entitled to
bring derivative actions as a stock pledgee and secured creditor of'
an insolvelrt corporation under T.C. tj 30-1-746, virl~ichdoes not
expressly prohibit a stock pledgee or secured creditor of an
insolvent corporation from pursuing derivative clai~ns?
s. Can a district court award attorneys' fees to a defendant pursuant
to I.C. 5 12- 1 2 1 after plaintiffs complaint was dismissed pursuant
to Rule 12@)(6) based in part upon the district court adopting the
"Litigation Privilege" as a first impression defense?

r.

Can a district court find that a plaintiff pursued an action
frivolously when the plaintiff is a secured creditor who pursues
claims against attorneys who have received payment for services
from funds subject to valid and perfected security interests and/or
the proceeds of such valid and perfected security interests?

1.1.

Can a district co~lrtmake findings of facts that attorney defendants
did not violate any rules of professional conduct in an action
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in
plaintiffs complaint state that the attorneys violated rules of
professional collduct?

v. foan attorneys' fees and costs iud~mentthat
was paid during the pendency of an appeal render the issue of
whether the attorneys' fees were improperly nranted nloot when
tht. jud~mcnttlebios
the j~lci~rnc~~ts
o t ~ tol' lkar of esecution?
///
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w Since it was determined after the entry of an order granting a

rhere was no iinal iudrrn~crltentered, did
district cutirt err hy
lmt vncnting tttc order and i~idgmentrc; attnrncvs' kes siltce Ihcre
was no prevailing party in an action at the t i m ~ t h eo r d e ~ a ~ d
judgment were entered?
4.

There has not been an Order sealing all or any portioil ofthis record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested.

6.

Appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's

record, in addition to those arltomaticalIy included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
a. This Second Amended-Notice of Appeal;
b. Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal;
c. Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Appeal;
d, DefendantsWotion to Dismiss:
e. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss;
f. Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss;
g. Plaintiff's Motiorl to Amend and Supplement Complaint (including
the attached proposed First Amended CompIaint);

11. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend Complaint;
i . Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dislniss and
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint;
j.

Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees:

k. Defendants' Brief in Support of Costs and Attol~ney'sFees;
1.

Affidavit of James LaRue in Support of Memorandum Costs and
Attorneys' Fees;

m. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs;
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11.

Affidavit of h4ichael S. Bissell in Suppoi-t of Iqaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's h/lotioti to Disallow Defendants' Request for Attorney's
Fees an3 Costs;

o. Defendar-rts' Notion for Leave to Amend
Memorarldrr~nof Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

Defendants'

p. Defendants' Brief in Support of h4otion for Leave to Amend
DefendantsWemorandum of Costs and Attol.neys' Fees;
q. Plaintifrs Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs h/lotiozl to
Disallow Fees and Costs;

r. Del'el~dantsXemorandum in Response to Reed Taylor's Motion
to Disallow Request far Attorney's Fees and Costs;
s. PlaintifPs Response to Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend
Mernorandrun of Costs and Fees;
t.

Plaintiff's Reply to DefendantsResponse to Plaintiffs Motion to

Disallow Fees and Costs;
tt.

Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

v. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney
Fees and Costs;
w. Judgment;
x. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Opinion, Order and

Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees to Defendants;
y. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Opinion and Order Awarding Attorney's
Fees to Defendants;

z. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration; and
aa. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration

and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.

7.

1 certify that:
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a reporter

because a tratlscript has not been requested.
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b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested.
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid,
d. Tile appellate filing fee has been paid.

e. Setvice has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

DPITED this 25Ih day of March, 2010.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLI,C

Roderick C. Bond
h4ichaeI S. Bissell
Attorneys for Appellant Reed J. Taylor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25"' day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of Appellant's Third Amended Notice of Appeal to the following:
HAND
--x.U.S.
OVERNIGHT MAIL
DELIVERY
MAIL

FAX TRANSMISSION
- EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

2%

Jeffrey A. Thornsoll
James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704
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Jhtlres U.LaR~te IS13 P 1 780
Jci'fr~yA . Thnmsvn IS13 833 80 1
ELAM & BURKE, P.iZ
2.5 1 E. I:rorit Street, Suite 3011
I'.O. Box i 539
Bo~sc,ldnho 83701

Telepllone: (208) 343-2454
F a c s ~ ~ n i l r(208)
:
384-5846

IN TI IE DISTRIC1 COURT OF TI IE SECOND JLiDleIAL OlSTRlCT Of: 'I'HE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'I'Y OF NEZ PERCE
Reed J . Taylor, an individual;

Case No. CV 08-01 763

Pla~nr~ff'AppcllanL,

PARTIAL OPPOSl'fION TO TAYLOR'S
REQTJCST FOR JUDICIAL NO'I'1CE RE:
DEFENDAN'I'S' JOINT R/IOTION FOR
AMENDI'D JUDGMENTS

V.

I\llOl IAEL C. hlcNIGHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P A , ari
ldnho professionel corporation; ,!ANE DOES I -V,
ilhknown i n d i ~ ~ d u a l s ,

I

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;

Case No, CV 08-0 1765

GARY D.I3Al'%i3l'i"i',nn individi~itl;D.JOHN
AS1 IDY, nI1 individual: PATRICK V . COLLINS, an
i~liiividual;RICHAI<I) A. RILEY, HI\ individual;
IIAWI.EY 'TKOXELL ENNlS & IiAWI,EY LLI'.
tin

Idaho litnircd linbilily ~)artnersl~ip;
J A N E DOES

[-X,u~tknow~b
individuals;

I. INTRODUCTION

'I'he Hawicy 'l'roxcli Det'cndants do not ohjecr to this Courl taking judicial notice of the
two memoranda from thc Ada County lawsuit c~~titled
Tuyiclr. v. Riley, Hui14i.yTruxcll E~tnjs&

PAK'1'1.4L OPPOSlTlOM 1'0TAYLOR'S REQUES'T FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE KE: DEFENDANTS'
JCI1N'I'~~0'1'f01\;FOR AMENDED JUDCbIENTS - I

Ilcrlt j q , LLIf IZohct.r :tl. Tiirr?hort*irr?~.iEherle Brr./ir? Grc/ii?,qTilrnborc. B 2tfirh'la~t.tz~,
C'l7/ci, Case

No. C\'-(SC-0918868 attached as Exhiblts ,+Iand B to h1r. Bond's Affidavit. These Dek~idants
do object, howcicr, to the relief sought - that this Court defer ruling on the pending Joint bfotion
for Amended Judgments. It'this Court takes jc~dicialnotice of Exhibits it and B, this Court can
take judicial notice that 'Taylor has now filed a second malpractice lawsuit in a different judicial
district ("'I"ay1or 11") against some of the same parties sued in this malpractice action ("Taylor 1''~.
'I'his Court can also take notice that this second malpractice action involves issues that were or
could have been litigated in the first malpractice action. In other words, this Court can take
judicial notice that the second malpractice action is an attempt to forum and judge shop, to
promote disrespect of this Court's decision by seeking to again litigate to potentially inconsistent
results, and to create confusion and chaos by filing a multiplicity of needless litigation. (See
Bond Aff. Ex, '4, p. 8 and cases cited therein.)
If this Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits A and B, it will note that these documents
do not stand for the propositions claimed by Taylor; that Taylor completely misses the point of
Hawley Troxell's positions taken in Taylor I and Taylor 11; that these positions are not
inconsistent; that the request to defer a ruling asks this Court to make extra-judicial decisions
with affects beyond its jurisdiction; that Taylor seeks to manipulate the Court system; and that
the foundation of 'faylor's request for judicial notice does not apply at all to Co-Defendants
Clcnients Broi%nand MichaeI McNichols. Most importantly, even ifjudicial notice is taken of
E ~ h i b i t si\ and R from Taylor 11, they do not establish grounds to defer a ruling on the pending
.Ioint Motion for Amended Judgments in this action.

I'i\Jii'I;\L OIJf'OSI?'ION 7 ' 0 f t \ Y L O R ' S REQUEST FOR J U D I C I A L N O TlCE RE: D E F E N D A N T S '
1(j1'.1 r h 1 0 f I O N FOR i\kIENDtJD JUDCXIEN TS - 2

11. f%NALYSIS
,A.

Re$ Jfrilirrrtrr in Taylor iI vs. Finid Aprtc;~l;tble,Juti~mentsin 'T;\vlor I.
Snrprisingly, Ta3 lor wants this Court to knotv that, unhappy with this Court's disnzissal

of this malpractice action, he has tiled a second malpractice action against some of the same

parties named in the first lawsuit (Riley and Hawley Troxell) based on the same or similar issues
thar were or cotlfd have been litigated in this action. The apparent, but not very clear, reason for
informing this Court that he is attempting to relitigate this first malpractice lawsuit is iln alleged
inconsistency between the positions taken by Wawley Troxell in the two malpractice actions,
There are, in fact, no inconsistencies. There are only decisions to be made by different courts
regarding the legal effect in each case of this Court's Orders and Opinions, Judgments and
potential Ainended Judgments.
The issue to be decided in this case (Taylor I) is not whether the Orders and Opinions and
Judgments entered by this Court are final, but whether they are appealable. Spokane ,rtrtlctures
and Gooc/mnn Oil have established what is necessary for an appeal. Neither case, however,
determines the effect of non-appealable Opinions and Orders upon the application of res jtltlicutn
in another case. Whether an instrument is appealable requires a different analysis from whether
an instrument is a final judgment for rrsjutlicc~ttrpurposes. It could well be that an instrument is
final for recording purposes, execution, attorney fees or tsesj~icliccrtcrbut is not an instrument
from which an appeal lies. These are open questions that have been created but not decided by
the ,Tj?oktrneS~r~t~'tzire.s
and Gooclt?lunOil cases.
The important point is each respective court nust decide for itself the legal effect of the
Opinions and Orders and Judgments or Amended Judgments upon thar particiliar case. For
instance, i t is

LIPto

this Court to determine i~hetheri t should cure the prematurity of'Trlylor's
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rippeals and, if so, uhether the proposed Amended Judginents are the proper cure. On the other
hand, it is up to Acfa County District Judge Crerntvood in Taylor I f to determine whether the
current Opinions and Orders and Judgments tire suf1iciently final for purposes of res jrrdicolu or
~vhether/.ex jridicntil requires a final, a~pealable
judgment.'
In fact, and as Exhibits '4 and B indicate, the appealability of a judgment inay have no
effect upon its finality for res judiccitu purposes,
'-/T]he preclusive effects of a lower court judgment cannot be
suspended simply by taking an appeal that remains undecided." C.
Wight, A. Miller & E. Cooper, FederuI Practice cmd Procec/tire, fj
4433 at 305 (198 1). "The bare act of taking an appeal is no more
effective to defeat preclusion than a failure to appeal. The
established rule in the federal courts is that a final judgment retains
all of its res jrrclicntn consequences pending decisions of the appeal
apart from the virtually non-existent situation in which the 'appeal'
actually involves a trial de novo. Id., I j 4433 at 308."
See Ex. A, pp. 1 1- 12.
Hawley Troxell has not taken inconsistent positions. I t may indeed be the law that a
document that ends the litigation (in this case, the Opinions and Orders) is a final judgment for
purposes of res jtidcutn but is not an appealable judgment. Taylor has taken the position in this
case that the Opinions and Orders are still appealable despite Spokane Strzkctures and now is
doing all he can to avoid ripening his own appeals based on his desire to get a different appeal
heard before this one. It certainly appears to be the (new) law that even if these documents are
final they are not appealable. Hawley Troxell has consistently argued in this case that it seeks a

'Equally important is the fact that i t t v i l l be lip to the Idaho Suprenle Court to determine
nhether the current instruments are tinal, appealable instruments thereby conferring jiirisdiction
o\,er the appeal or whether they are not, thereby depriving it ofjilrisdiction. I t remains the
Defendants' position that Amended Judgments will create no harm or prejudice within Taylor I
and \sill cure the prematurity of Taylor's appeals thereby allowing the appeals to move forward
011 the merits. This does not, however, create inconsistencies.
P A R i'I.\L Of'POSITION r0 TAYLOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIt4L NO'TICE RE: DEFENDijN PS'
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tiu;il, apoenlnble j ~ ~ d g m m
which
t
is not inconsistent with arguing in the second malpractice case

that ~ ~ l ~not
t l r~ppealable
e
these Orders and Opinions are tinal for rrs jrrclictrl~lpurposes.

B.

The Request for 'Judicial Notice ilnd Tavlar's Opposition to the ,Joint Motion for
Amended .Juilements Seek to TuTuninulnte the Court Svstem.
'Taylor's opposition to and rlo~vthis request to defer ruling on the Joint Motion for

Amended Judgments is an attempt to manipulate the court system in three separate jurisdictions.
First, Taylor has requested that if Amended Judgments are filed in this action they contain
language that puts him in a better position than this Coiirt's original rulings. The attempt to use
the efforts to cure jurisdiction over his own appeals to better his position in this case is a
inanipulatior~of the court system.
Second, the request to take judicial notice of Exhibits A and B makes it clear that Taylor
seeks to manipulate the second malpractice action by asking this Court to either issue Amended
Judgments that somehow have no res jtrcficilta effect or to defer the ruling so that he can argue
that there is no final judgment for purposes o f r e s jlidiiicufu in the second malpractice action. This
is not only a manipillation of the court system but a request to this Court to make its decision
based on how it may or may not affect matters outside of this case and beyond this Court's
jurisdiction.
Third, Taylor seeks to manipulate the court system in order to affect two appeals pending
before the Idaho Supreme Court. I-fe asks this Court to defer ruling upon the Joint Motion for
.\mended Judgtnents so that the Supreme Court will determine his appeal in this action is
preinatulveand dismiss the appeal so that he can push his other '-pending appeal in Tfijdor.v iJIL~l
S'~.~-r.ices,
rt LII. to be heard and decided first in the interest o f all parties." See Bond XfL,

7 6.
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'This Court should not allow Taylor's attempts to manipulate the court system. I'his
Court stiould consider only the affect of its rulings on this lawsuit and rule based on that analysis.
'The legal effect of that decision can then be applied by each respective court to each respective
case.

C.

Nothin? About Taylor's Onposition or This Request for ,Judicial Notice Affects the
CIemcnts Brown Defendants' Rirht to an Snnealable Judgment.

'The grounds to defer a ruling on the Joint Motion for Amended Judgments do not apply
to the Clernents Brown Defendants. There is no second malpractice action against them. There
is no other foruin in which they have taken a position, inconsistent or otherwise, about the effect
of the Opinions and Orders entered in this case. This Court's ruling on an Amended Judgment

for the Clements Brown Defendants will have no effect on Taylor's other lawsuits or interests'
and should therefore not be deferred.

111. CONCLUSION
While the Wawley Troxell Defendants have no objection to this Court taking judicial
notice of Exhibits A and B from Taylor 11, they do object to the relief sought by this request. A
decision should be made on the pending joint motion and should not be deferred. In fact, the

'The Ilawiey 'rroxell and Clements Brown cases have been consolidated tbr purposes of
appeal. Once one accepts that the Clements Brown Defendants are entitled to an Amended
Judgment, the logical fallacy of Taylor's request to defer a ruling is fillly illustrated. I t makes 110
sense to allow Taylor's premature appeal against the Clements Brown Defendants to be cured
and proceed forward to the substantive issues, yet defer ruling on an ilrnended Judgment in the
FIawley Troxell case, leading to dismissal of Taylor's appeal against the Hawley Troxell
Defendants h r lack of jurisdiction.
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liauley rrouell Delcndants continue to urgv the Coilrt to make its decision as rl~iicklyas possible

because oral argument is scheduled on April 9,20 10.'

DATED this

'? day of March, 20 10
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:

, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley,
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 7 day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL
BISSELL& KIRBY,PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH,
JANIS& BRODY,CHTD.
537 West Bannock Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2582

X

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-71 1 1
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
342-2927

'lt should be noted that in response to a qiiestion fiom the Conrt, Bond agreed that an
expedited decision on the pending joint motion would be beneficial to all panies. Defendants are
unaivare of any new event or information that noiv has Bond arguing ..tLII ahead. stop".
PARTIIIL OPPOSITION 'TO T/\Y LOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOrlCE RE: DEFENDAN.TS'
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Hepworih, Janis & Brody

MAR 1- 2 20f8
Boise, 119

IN THlE DISTftICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDMJO, IN .UW FOR THE COUNTY OF NEE PERCE

W E D J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

v.
MICIfiEL E.. McNICKOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS,
P A,, an Idaho professional corporation;
JANE DOES I-V, unknown individuals;

CASE NO. CV08-0 1763

1
1
1

.JUDGMENT

)
)

Defendants.
The Court, having entered an Order on December 23,2008 granting Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT that Plaintiff Reed .7. Taylol's
Amended Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.

Dated this

/&

day of March 20 10.

/'--'I

CERTIFICAE OF MAILING

I hereby certiiiji that a true copy of the foregoi~lgO P M O N & ORDER was:
hand delixrered via court basket, or
/mailed,
postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
March 20 10, to:

Michael S. Bissell
Roderick C. Bond
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard St, Ste 4 16
Spoltane, WA 99201

John J. Janis
Wepworth, Janis, & Brody, Chtd.
PO Box 2582

Taylor vs
Judgment

McNichols, et a1

/B9%day of

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JVDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDALIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

1
)

Plaintiff,

1

)
)
)
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN )

ASHBY, an individual; PATRTCK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
RTLEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

CASE NO. CV08-0 1765
JUDGMENT

)

1

)
)
)

1

Defendants.
fie Court, having entered an Order on December 13, 2008 granting Defendants' Motion

to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT that Plaintiff Reed I. Taylor's
Amended Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.

Dated this

/@ day of March 20 10.

-

1 hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPZNION & ORDER was:

hand delivered via court basket, or

/ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
March 20 10, to:

Michael S. Bissell
Roderick C. Bond
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard St, Ste 416
Spokane, WA 99201

Taylor vs. Babbitt, et al
I~~cfgtnent

9%

day of

Hepworth, Janis & Br0dY

MAR 2 4 201W
Boise, It2

JVDICIAL DISTRTCT OF THE
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THX
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TED3 COWTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,

1
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV08-01763

M N D E D SUI)GMENT

1

V

MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & McNICWOLS,
P A , an Idaho professional corporation;
JANE DOES I-V, unknown individuals;
Defendants.

)
)
)

1
1
1

)

The Court, having entered an Order on December 23, 2008 granting Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY THE .JUDGMENT OF THEi COURT that Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's

Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety

Dated this Zi?.-- day of March 2010
/"7

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing O P M O N & ORDER was:

hand delivered via court basket, or

d

mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
March 2010, to:

Michael S. Bissell
Roderick C. Bond
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard St, Ste 4 16
Spokane, WA 9920 1

John J. .Tanis
Hepworth, Janis, & Brody, Ghtd.
PO Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701

Taylor vs. McNichols, et al
Amended Judgment

4

&
day of

THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND

STRICT OF THE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

CASE NO. CV08-0 1765

AMENDED WDGMENT

)
)

)
)
)

Defendants.
The Court, having entered an Order on December 23,2008 granting Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT that Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's

Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.

Dated this

22

day of March 20 10.

CERTIFIGAE OF Mt?tILING

I hereby certify that a true copy of'the foregoing OPMION & ORDER was:

hand delivered via court basket, or
f' L

/mailed,
postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
March 20 1 0, to:

Michael S. Bissell
Roderick C. Bond
Campbell, Bisseil & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard St, Ste 416
Spokane, WA 9920 1

James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke PA
PO Box 1539

Taylor vs. McNichols, et al.
Arnended Judgment

d2 day of

